Showing posts with label McLuhan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label McLuhan. Show all posts

Sunday, July 4, 2010

Mobile Technosoma: some phenomenological reflections on itinerant media devices, Ingrid Richardson


Murdoch University, Western Australia

Portable media devices and 'wearable' communications technologies are becoming both increasingly ubiquitous and personalised, penetrating and transforming everyday cultural practices and spaces, and further disrupting distinctions between private and public, ready-to-hand and telepresent interaction, actual and virtual environments. Such devices range from the standard mobile phone – which itself is exceeding its role as a communication device – to highly sophisticated multimedia hybrids, personal digital assistants (PDAs), MP3 players, personal media centres and handheld networkable game consoles. This article presents some initial thoughts pre-empting a bigger research project on mobile connectivity and media, and their emergence as portable microworlds or pocket technospaces. The project en large aims to investigate the emerging socio-cultural and techno-corporeal effects of mobile interactive media, and how they are changing the ways people interact with both their digital interfaces and each other, altering the shape and meaning of community and spatial location, and our embodied and agentic placement within metropolitan, pedestrian (i.e. literally 'walkable') and urban environments.

Much of the research and analysis in this project will focus on the mobile phone itself and its ostensible mutability into digital video camera, email and web interface, MP3 player, personal organiser, wireless broadband laptop-link, data storage and game device. In her study on mobile phone use in the global context, Sadie Plant observes that the mobile phone is often used as the primary means of Internet access (Plant, 2003).[1] The multi-functionality of the mobile phone, together with high-speed wireless third generation (3G) and Wi-Fi (wireless fidelity) networks, and the adoption of Internet protocol technology, means that both mobile phone carriers and makers of handheld phones are poised to move beyond the voice market and into that of mobile media and data communication (strategy+business magazine, May 10, 2004). Moreover, today's advanced handsets 'are disrupting many industries simultaneously, including photography, music and games' (The Australian, September 7, 2004).

Yet while the mobile phone is perhaps the most significant technology in the context of this project, and will be the focus of much of this article, it is part of a more general telematic trend towards wearable, handheld and pocket communications and entertainment media. Aside from the multimedia mobile phone, MP3 player and PDA, there exist a number of handheld interactive media devices including Nintendo's GameBoy and DS (dual screen), Sony's PlayStation Portable (PSP), phone-game hybrids such as Nokia's N-Gage QD and Samsung's recent rival (the SCH-V450), and the Digital Multimedia Broadcasting (DMB) handset which can receive TV broadcasts over the cellular network. The PSP, for example, has been launched as an all-in-one multimedia entertainment platform targeted for the adult market, with a USB 2.0 port for further expandability and connectivity to other devices, and the capability for wireless multiplayer interaction, network applications and data transfer. Thus, such handheld games and portable multimedia devices are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and should be examined both in terms of their potential merger with mobile phone functionality, and in their own right as nascent new media forms. Significantly, over the past two decades many of the distinctions between mass media and communications technologies have converged to become – as suggested at a recent symposium – "network media" ('Network Media: Code Culture, Convention' Symposium, University of Western Australia, September 9-11, 2004). As services based upon telecommunications – mobile telephony, the internet, video-on-demand, personal video recorders (PVRs), interactive television (iTV) – become progressively experienced as everyday media content, the environments of information and communication merge. Such a shift means that 'audiences' become 'users' (or agents), effecting changing relationships between individuals and society, private and public domains, temporal and spatial perception, location and presence, embodiment and interface.

The traditional logic underlying media theory considered every media object to be assembled in some kind of media factory (like a Hollywood studio), such that multiple identical copies produced from a master could be distributed to those with access to the medium; broadcasting, film distribution, and print technologies all follow this logic (Manovich, 2001). In a new media environment – via programmable, personalisable, interactive, hybridised, convergent and networkable technologies – rather than media objects being made available to mass audiences, individuals are increasingly micro-targeted: film and TV productions now engender multiple media manifestations (value-added websites, interactive DVDs with extras and games, customised mobile content); every visitor to a website can view their own custom version created on-the-fly from a database; personal digital video recorders enable television consumers to pre-programme their own 'niche-TV'. The mobile handset and portable console are also devices residing in this nexus between communication and information: one's child can be kept busy during a long drive watching the Garfield movie or playing games on Mum's Nokia; video and image content can be captured by the mobile's inbuilt digital camera and transmitted to friends via email, downloaded onto a computer or viewed on a domestic TV set or home theatre.

Clearly the cultural impact of digital telecommunications, 'narrowcast' and network media are impossible to apprehend with models that assume mass audiences and mass distributed messages. Over the past decade, the conceptual development of what has been termed 'new media theory' has sought to effectively grasp this imbrication of media and communications, and the changes wrought by the interactive and manipulable potential of digital technologies (Lunenfeld, 1999; Bolter and Grusin, 2000; Manovich, 2001; Munt, 2001; Wardrip-Fruin and Montfort, 2003; Lister et al, 2003; Everett and Caldwell, 2003; Hansen, 2004). To date key new media texts such as these have not engaged explicitly with the mobile phone, pocket computer or game console as 'new media' with their own specificity. In texts which do include chapters on mobile phone use (Munt, 2001), the mobile is considered primarily as a voice or text transmission device, with no account of its emergence as an interactive digital medium. Yet clearly the current mobile media environment is evolving beyond the basic provision of information and voice/text transmission services. Today's handhelds are becoming increasingly multifunctional sociotechnical devices, portable and interactive technospaces which enfold (and unfold) an assortment of media forms. This transformation requires a critical approach that considers mobile media as more than telecommunications tools, but also as hybrid interfaces within a multi-platform or trans-mediascape, as 'containers' of discrete and connected virtual worlds (Sofia, 2000), as occasional or dedicated consoles of ludic and narrative connectivity, and as emergent nodes of creativity and digital art. Although mobile media forms have not yet undergone sustained analysis in the new media texts mentioned above, it is important that they be considered both as communication tools and info-mediatic assemblages within which the technologies and practices of communication, information and media come together.[2] Thus while communication-based analyses of mobile phones and devices will provide a useful context and framework for understanding some of the complex effects, perceptions and patterns-of-use, I aim to approach the mobile phone and portable interface as a new and interactive media form.

Existing research on the mobile phone itself resides mainly in the areas of sociology, cultural studies, communications theory, urban design, social psychology, anthropology and usability (Townsend, 2000; Sussex Technology Group, 2001; Bautsch et al, 2001; Katz and Aakhus, 2002; Mitchell, 2003; Plant, 2003; Lindholm and Keinonen, 2003; Kasesniemi, 2003; Rheingold, 2003; Geser, 2004, Goggin and Newell, 2004; Ling, 2004). Such studies have considered the mobile primarily in its capacity as voice-carrier and text-messager, and (for example) how it has changed the way we work and communicate (Katz and Aakhus), the various mobile-user types with which we identify (Plant), the increased decentralisation and 'nomadic intimacy' of mobile interaction (Geser), public perception and safety issues (Bautsch et al), disability and the digital mobility of text (Goggin and Newell), effects on teenage social behaviour (Kasesniemi), the emergence of 'flashmobs' or 'smartmobs' facilitated by mobile telephony (Rheingold), and its impact on urban society (Townsend, Mitchell, Ling). Not surprisingly, theorists have recently coined the term 'm-communication' to refer to the increasing dispersal of community and person-to-person relations by way of such devices, and the 'culture of interruptions' wrought by mobile telephony (Mitchell, 2003).

While these studies treat the mobile phone largely as a device for interpersonal and business communication, rather than as a medium for screen and sound media content, information or gameplay, there are some notable exceptions. These include Goggin's (2004) discussion of 'the aural irruptions of customised polyphonic ringtones' within contemporary soundscapes, Plant's (2003) various references to mobile-based artwork and the staging of an orchestrated collective ringtone symphony in London, and the trajectory Levinson (2004) traces between the mobile camera and mobile phone.[3] In her paper 'Mobile Art' presented at the Biennale of Electronic Art Perth in Australia (http://beap.org), Lisa Gye (2004) describes the supercession of wireless application protocol (WAP) with I-Mode technology (an always-on wireless internet platform recently launched by DoCoMo in Japan), which enables individual users to participate in a 'distributed aesthetics' by xml-coding their own mobile phone content, rather than simply downloading existing content/services; she reports on the creative media agency the-phone-book limited (http://the-phone-book.ltd.uk/) which provides workshops, downloadable freeware/shareware and code generators for mobile phone content. In contributing to these analyses of mobile telephony as both mediatic and communicative, in my own project I aim to elaborate on the corporeal and spatial effects of such mobile media forms.

Contemporary theorists of media and technology are currently grappling with the (non)corporeality and constitution of techno- and telespaces, and the way they are disturbing our commonplace notions of presence and location. In this context, the effects of miniaturised mobility on our experience of existing new and old media raises some interesting questions: How is the network literacy and ecology of the internet 'remediated' by mobile handset microbrowsers? Do our perceptions of media space, cyberspace and 'technospace' become transformed by the physical and vehicular mobility enabled by portable media? How does this portability impact upon the body-technology relation? What is the gender and cultural specificity of mobile media use and perception? How is mobility and networkability transforming our relation to screen and sound media? Does our experience of television and video change once viewed on mini-screens and out of familiar domestic contexts? When we carry mobile devices not just to maintain perpetual contact, but to watch TV, surf the web, or enter the virtual realtime space of SMS or MMS interactive narrative, what effect does this have on our relation to both the pedestrian and telepresent environment? Although many of these questions can't be answered in the scope of this article, they nevertheless highlight a field of enquiry that is focused on the medium specificity of mobile media and what could be termed their techno-corporeal or technosomatic attributes.

Medium Specificity Revisited

My approach is largely phenomenological, and framed within the broad premise that every human-technology relation produces certain kinds of being-in-the-world, and particular ways of knowing and making that world. The location of mobile phones and handheld media within this premise, and in terms of their own determining effects, implicitly realises the much-used media theory concept of medium specificity, and it is worth commenting briefly on the continuing salience of this term. Although some might question whether medium specificity is still a central concept at a time of digital convergence, I would argue that it remains critical to our understanding of contemporary media. At a seminar on interactive TV (iTV), Jane Roscoe and Fat Cow Motel developers Tracey Robertson and Nathan Mayfield claimed that media will not converge; rather, they will become increasingly multi-platform, such that each platform delivers appropriate and unique content, and with the mobile phone as an integral component of delivery.[4] This would suggest that medium specificity remains an important and viable conceptual tool, one that can continue to discern between proliferating digital media. Thus, for example, by organising data in particular ways, various interfaces may appear simultaneously or separately within the mobile screen or as audio content, but each mode of engagement (talk, text, email, micro-browsing, gaming, photography, word processing, etc.) will nevertheless still privilege particular corporeal attitudes, social agencies, and modes of (dis)engaging from both telepresent and immediate environments.

The application of medium specificity to new and supposedly convergent mobile media is also sustained by Bolter's and Grusin's (2000) new media concept of remediation, which in some respects is an effective reworking of McLuhan's 'laws of media' (McLuhan, 1964). McLuhan argued that each communication medium works to orchestrate the structure of perception, by preferencing certain sensory ratios over others in medium-specific ways; televisual media, for example, prioritise the visual and aural senses, and at least partially bracket out tactile, motile and olfactory modes of perception. In their collaborative work Remediation: Understanding New Media Bolter and Grusin (2000) suggest that this process is complicated by the way that contemporary digital media 'remediate' already mature cultural forms and vice versa, either by appropriating and integrating aspects of older media, or incorporating new media developments. For example, the mobile phone 'remediates' both photography and home video by rendering their transmission between geographically distant places all but immediate. The idea of technological trajectories is also central to remediation, questioning the notion that the latest technologies are 'new' by showing how their technical and cultural trajectories are partially set in place by previous technologies. Thus the telegraph, in severing communication from physical transportation, opened the way for our experience of — and foregrounded our familiarity with — today's more sophisticated telepresencing media. More recently, icon-based navigation on the mobile or PDA screen remediates the user-friendly desktop interface.

Following this trajectory of screen-to-screen remediation between mobile media and other larger screen media for a moment, it would seem that the complexity of the recursive relation between computer or TV screen and mobile screen confounds a number of assumptions made about our embodied and largely non-mobile engagement with televisual media. Manovich, for example, insists that despite numerous innovations in televisual media, the window remains as the archetypal interface:

Dynamic, real-time, interactive, a screen is still a screen. Interactivity, simulation, and telepresence: as was the case centuries ago, we are still looking at a flat, rectangular surface, existing in the space of our body and acting as a window into another space. We still have not left the era of the screen (Manovich, 2001: 115).

Within this metaphor the eyes alone must remain mobile, to traverse and visually 'handle' the surface space of the screen, while the body is held captive by the eyes' attachment. This front-to-front relationship, it is often argued, is one that we have with screens in general. In most cases the screen is a frame of limited dimensions within our own physical space, while the body's frontal relationship with the apparatus varies between media depending on what Manovich, pace Jonathan Crary, calls "viewing regimes" (2001: 96; Crary 1992, 1999). With cinema, for example, the viewer is at the outset fully frontal to the exclusion of all diversions, focusing entirely on the screen. In the optimum situation the boundary or interface between body and cinematic apparatus dissolves, a merger which manifests a change in orientation from being 'in front of' to being 'within,' an effect which is achieved by several factors: the size of the screen, the darkness of the theatre, and surround sound. In the case of television — with perhaps the home theatre an exception — the face-to-face relationship between the body and the set is somewhat more informal and less disciplined; viewers can look away to the familiarity of their domestic surroundings, move about or leave the room, or they can be visually and aurally attentive or inattentive to varying degrees, by muting the sound, zapping through channels, talking on the phone or conversing with co-watchers, and reading or engaging in other activities. This vacillating degree of attention and distraction clearly contravenes the perceived conventions of eye-body behaviour considered proper to screen-viewing. The 'eyes' of the mobile media device are even further distracted, by the surrounding clamour and moving objects on the street or sidewalk, by the latent lateral but ever-ready possibilities of incoming messages, and by the mobility of one's own body. Laura Singer suggests that screens function as areas of focus only when they are 'surrounded by a zone of inattention' (Singer, 1990: 55). This is almost always not the case with mobile communication; in fact rarely is mobile connectivity a 'dedicated' practice — it is always-already surrounded by other objects and activities within the spatial topography of the built environment. Thus even with this brief example of the mobile phone's particular modes of embodied use, it is apparent that mobile devices demand their own body-technology relations, and thus a medium specific phenomenological approach.

Phenomenology of Mobile Media

The work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1968), Don Ihde (1993), and later feminist accounts of 'intercorporeality' by Gail Weiss (1999) and Moira Gatens (1996) provide effective tools for interpreting the somatic intimacy of wearable and handheld media, their disruption to the spatial boundaries of everyday communicative practices, the communal effects of mobile connectivity, and the collective mobile-user habits of the wider cultural milieu. Through these theorists embodiment is considered to be under continuous modification by artifacts, somewhat reminiscent of Leibniz's monadology: all bodies are in perpetual flux, with 'parts… entering into them and passing out of them continually' (Leibniz, 1698). As Merleau-Ponty (1962) points out, the world is an agentic environment that also changes in common relation to our own flexible corporeality. Ihde's 'postphenomenology' adds to this interpretation by accounting for both the ontic and epistemic inclinations or biases of tools themselves (Ihde, 1993). Finally, in attending to both the equipmental and cultural specificity of our morphology, Weiss and Gatens argue that 'as-bodies' we are embedded within cultural and technical contexts where some kinds of endo- and exosomatic body forms and habits are privileged over others (Weiss, 1999: 66-67; Gatens, 1996). With these insights, and in the context of mobile media, I suggest that both tool and body are covalent participants – and coalesce as various technosoma – in the making of meaning and environment. It is our openness to the spatially non-coincident flesh of the world — not only bodily flesh but the 'stuff' of our environment — that allows us to incorporate technologies and equipment into our own corporeal organisation. In this understanding, then, the specificity of media forms can be documented and acknowledged as deeply integral to our culturally specific and collectively realised corporeal schemas. The insights of media theory and phenomenology have partly inspired my critical application the term soma, which when prefixed by such descriptors as techno, info, tele, endo and exo, among many others, can be used as a way of discerning medium and techno-specific effects on the lived body (Richardson, 2003). Each –soma blending can work to describe a way of being rather than a what of being; any soma is not an entity – as 'the body' might sometimes be understood – but a process/network or ontological schematic. This terminology aims to effectively combine the concepts of intercorporeality and medium specificity, and also to grasp the way in which individual bodies digest the collective embodiments or shared habits of the wider cultural milieu.

Today, our increasing remote interaction with the world — the possibility of extended intervals of telepresence or telematic perception — indicates a need to rearticulate our collective embodiments, our experience and understanding of materiality, corporeality and actuality, and to think through other ontologies, other ways of being-in-the-world, and in a Heideggerian sense, of being-with-equipment. In a number of discussions on new, online and cyberspatial media, it is assumed that such interaction facilitates a mode of disembodiment, such that we can leave the body behind. Against the notion that one can be even intermittently 'without a body' when using the internet, the telephone, or watching TV, telepresent media work on and modify the body, affording an altered sensorial engagement with the world. The specificity of this engagement can also be seen in our use of mobile media forms. The idea that disembodiment is possible relies largely on the supposition that our engagement with screen media requires a stationary body, such that one's awareness of the corporeal recedes. Yet as I have suggested mobile media complicate this relation, and facilitate a physical mobility of the body, whether pedestrian or vehicular, partially returning one's attention to physical location and the navigation within and around material environments.

In what follows I offer some preliminary observations of mobile media qua the body-technology relation. Just as we are familiar with the notion that sociocultural specificity is inherent to our embodiments and body-images, technological specificity itself is also — equally and collaboratively — an aspect of embodiment and agency. In other work Carly Harper and I have suggested that the notion of variable ontology can describe how being emerges through a network of extended relations between the body-subject and the equipmental environment (Richardson and Harper, 2002; 2003). Don Ihde's inventory of human-technology relations is particularly useful here; the body-technology relation peculiar to mobile phones and devices involves taking the technology into one's way of perceiving, 'through the reflexive transformation' of perceptual and body sense (Ihde, 1990: 72). In the case of wearable technologies and their transformative effects upon our sensorium and felt corporeal limits, the body and instrument form a temporary collusive entity — symbolically designated by Ihde as an [I-artifact]<--> world relation— which then apprehends or handles the world in specific ways. Thus, in a general sense the body-telemedia gathering modifies spatial and sensory perception, by changing what is 'proximal', or the relation between 'here' and 'there'. Concepts such as telepresence, non-space, virtuality, and telepistemology (Goldberg, 2000) are all attempts to describe and explain the spatial and ontic effects of such telemedia on our being-in-the-world.

The term telepresence, for example — which refers to the kind of 'distant presence' enabled by telecommunication devices — is a seemingly oxymoronic concept which demands we comprehend alternative modalities of embodiment not necessarily based on our 'normalised' tropes of the physical entity, body, substance or containment. Yet the ability to experience telepresence as part of our mundane and everyday practices is but one instance of our ready incorporation of tools and media into our corporeal schematics, and as extensions of our bodies and our perception. That we can oscillate between, conflate and adapt to ostensibly disparate modes of being and perceiving – i.e. to being simultaneously 'here' and 'there' – is precisely why telepresence and virtual space are ontologically tolerable. That is, the very condition of telepresence – as 'presence at a distance' speaks of our capacity for ontic dispersion beyond the neat physical limits of the body, and our open-ness to the embodied distraction of televisual and telephonic spaces. Thus although on one level it might be said that telepresence is troubling to our common experience of spatial perception and corporeality, we might wonder at how rapidly our reaction to radio, telephony, TV, online and mobile technologies becomes rather ho-hum and habitual. Telemedia may elicit an ambiguous nonspace, but we clearly integrate this ontological blurring quite unproblematically into our adaptive technosomas.

Nevertheless, from a phenomenological perspective it is intriguing to examine the characteristics of telepresence more closely, and the way in which a sense of presence can be felt beyond the location of the physical body. Both telephonic and televisual technologies have problematised the viability of distinctions between interiority and exteriority; in tactile face-to-face contact, or mechanised travel, distance is felt, timely, knowable, but in our use of televisual and telephonic technologies the distance traversed is simultaneously both so far and so close (phone to ear, remote in hand), that the space has been described as virtual – or in Heidegger's sense, part of the 'as if' structure of our awareness. The term distraction – originating from distrahere, or to pull in different directions – aptly describes how our attention becomes divided when we speak or text on the phone. It suggests that the locus of our perception is divided between the 'here' and 'there,' such that we can know different times and spaces simultaneously, an effect which shifts the boundaries of what 'immediacy' is, and how it is defined and experienced.

As Sadie Plant suggests, in mobile phone use this often results in a sense of incompatibility or inappropriateness between the conversation-context and the very public spaces (buses, trains, sidewalks, etc.) wherein we frequently find ourselves answering the mobile:

Certain conversations can induce emotional and bodily responses which may be quite incompatible with [mobile users'] perceptions of their physical location. Their participants often look as though they don't quite know what to do with themselves, how to reconfigure the tones of voice and postures which would normally accompany such conversations. The mobile requires its users to manage the intersection of the real present and the conversational present in a manner that is mindful of both (Plant, 2004: 50).

This interpretation of distraction, to describe a fragmenting or pulling apart of one's attention and spatial focus, also resonates with Sam Weber's (1996) insightful critique of Benjamin's and Heidegger's use of the comparable German terminology Zerstreuung or Zerstreutheit. Zerstreuung literally translates as 'distraction' but 'the root of the German words — the verb streuen — is cognate to the English “strew, strewn” and carries with it a strong spatial overtone' (Weber, 1996: 92). Benjamin employs Zerstreuung to refer to medium-specific features of mobile camera production and reception which involve the physical cutting and editing of film and the apprehension of these reconstituted fragments by the viewing public. Weber notes that the term Zerstreuung in Heidegger's usage describes the way Dasein constitutes itself by/as being scattered, establishing 'a link between Dasein's physicality — or more exactly, its 'fleshiness', its Leiblichkeit — and its fragmented, dispersed ways of being' (Weber, 1996: 92). In the experience of mobile connectivity, when this dispersion involves pedestrian, commuting, cycling or 'public' modes of embodiment – that is, of bodies-in-motion – the link between one's physical and distracted being becomes quite explicitly an issue for the caller. Thus when 'on the mobile', we have both the easy capacity for ontic dispersion beyond the physical limits of the body that enables telephonic and televisual interactivity on-the-move, yet also the penchant to locate ourselves and each other both temporally and spatially – by identifying our physical situation ('I'm on the bus') and our temporal context (I'll be there in 5 minutes').

Any discussion of pedestrian embodiment and mobile media use cannot go without at least a brief reference to de Certeau's (1984) interpretation of the way in which a pedestrian makes possible the space of the city in collusion with the built environment. The steps one takes – the act of walking through the city – is surely altered by mobile phones and other portable devices. De Certeau argues that 'a spatial order organizes an ensemble of possibilities', places where one can go and objects blocking or redirecting one's path; at the same time the pedestrian trajectory actualises and creates some of these possibilities simply through the 'improvisation of walking' (1984: 98). Yet potentially, this trajectory can be quite radically revised and re-possibilised by the interruption of a mobile phone call or text message, by listening to and downloading music, by the beep of one's PDA warning of an impending meeting or deadline, by changes in the immediate soundscape, or by those telepresent on the other end of the phone becoming 'virtually' integrated into one's route. Moreover, mobile media elicit variable levels attention and inattention that shift between actual and telepresent space, partially depending on the demands of the immediate environment and the extent to which the interface becomes ready-to-hand in a Heideggerian sense (i.e. its function and usability recede from explicit awareness). Thus one's own technosoma may 'behave' in ways that accord with (or deviate from) consensual and recognised modes of being-on-the-phone, such as stopping, bowing the head, shielding one's mouth or face with the hand to define a provisional private space, or deliberately not altering one's trajectory or visual orientation, as is the case with the more blatant Bluetooth® pedestrian. In such responses the various postures and embodied actions, and the dynamics of attention-inattention, are quite specific to the body-mobile relation which has emerged throughout the last decade. The body becomes quite literally a mobile-specific mediatrope – inclined metaphorically, corporeally, communicatively and gesturally towards the mobile media device.

Indeed, the notion of a relational and variable ontology understands the body – pace Haraway (1991) – as a material-semiotic assemblage with mediatropic tendencies, disposed both figuratively and materially towards media. As theorists such as Henri Lefebvre (1974) and Norman O. Brown (1966) have argued, tropes and metaphors have an essential role in our understanding and experience of both the world and our own bodies/selves. Telemedia offer a range of corporealist tropes, such as the synechdochal 'all-hands-and-eyes' experience of interactive screens and games, or the way in which the mobile phone-body becomes — metonymically — a pedestrian or vehicular node of networked communication (Martin, 2002). If we remember that the combining form –trope indicates an affinitive turn towards something, then telemedia have had significant tropological effects on our corporeal schematics; our modes of embodiment 'turn towards' specific technologies and media interfaces. For example, as is most often the case with our use of contemporary media, the hand-eye-screen interface or the hand-eye-remote control arrangement works as the preferred default, and various body-postures and communicative attitudes become prioritised. Thus, we perceptually 'attend' to the world in ways that are 'allowed' by the medium's inclination or trajectory in Ihde's sense, a phenomenological understanding of technosoma that is also consonant with the concept of medium specificity.

As I have suggested, the phenomenological approach offers a way to begin a theorisation of telesomatic involvements by apprehending mobile device usage as quite literally a mode of embodiment, a way of 'having a body'. Such a perspective considers mobile media as aspects of the body-subject's corporeal schema, both transforming and transformative: specific media are conducive to specific body-media comportments. As Drew Leder comments:

[I]ncorporation is the result of a rich dialectic wherein the world transforms my body, even as my body transforms its world… The demands and solicitations of the world gradually lead me to reshape the ability structure of my body… [The] dialectical body-world relation is concretized even in the simplest of instruments. Ordinarily, any tool will have one end specifically adapted to our human anatomy; the handle of the saw is designed to fit the hand. However, the other end is adapted to the world upon which we act… To incorporate a tool is to redesign one's extended body until its extremities expressly mesh with the world (Leder, 1990: 34).

Phenomenologically, the handset or portable console becomes an incorporative aspect of the hand, a body-part in itself of some consequence as a mutable and world-shaping device. The techno-corporeality of handset use is of particular interest in the relational ontology of mobile media and body, as the relationship between corporeal schematics and networkable devices quite literally embodies telepresence. In this context the technical and ergonomic configuration of the mobile media device is significant. Handsets and portable game consoles are designed with the specificities of particular interfaces, hybrid devices, and user-bodies in mind. In the optimal embodiment relation, the device should become transparent; the 'best' usability is one which recedes from the user's awareness, such that the liminal gap between hand and instrument goes all but unnoticed. An almost universal experience of handset use is of the numbered buttons arranged in a pattern familiar to many other devices (e.g. calculators and automatic teller machines), that is, the 1 to 9 matrix. We use both our sense of touch and, at least initially, visual recognition to coordinate the position of the numbers in relation to each other, and since human hands are in general anatomically similar, we might expect a common technosomatic relation between hand and mobile phone device. Yet even a preliminary investigation of the phenomenology of mobile phone use suggests that a diversity of problematics and relations have surfaced according to the specificities of culture and sociotechnical context (Richardson, 2005; Plant, 2003). For example, SMS use is widespread only in some (sub)cultures and age groups in Australia, South-East Asia and Japan, and has been deemed particularly vital to networking groups that depend on near-instant distributed information such as smart mobs (Rheingold, 2003). Such emergent habits and practices indicate the need for a detailed phenomenological study into the peculiarities of text messaging.

Our corporeal intimacy with the handset or portable console renders it an object of tactile and kinaesthetic familiarity, although it is salient to mention here that the growing complexity of mobile devices can also bewilder the non-expert user. In such cases there is a conflicting 'disincorporation' between the device and the hand-body. While a reciprocity between tool and body drives the technical specifications and ergonomic development of every apparatus, there is often resistance, in the interstices of our many technosomatic assemblages. The materialities of human bodies and nonhuman bodies are often in ontic conflict, and ensuing material-semiotic compromises are deeply embedded in the trajectories of body-tool relations. Keyboards and keypads must remain of certain proportion in order to fit the somatic specificity of human hands, despite the technology surpassing the need for such bulk. When keypads are repurposed for text messaging, however, the containment of the phonetic alphabet (and punctuation/symbols) to nine buttons renders the interface overly compact and awkward, which would seem to discourage prolific use. But SMS communication demands less, or differently, than traditional voice conversation – a sensory and somatic commitment that is suitable for some situations (such a public lecture), but not for others (such as driving). It is also flexibly either more immediate or deferred that a letter or email, and it is these enablements that encourage frequent use and thus practised dexterity, and vitiate against mobile-body 'disincorporation' and issues of poor usability. Nevertheless, the teleology of technological design is always towards the reconciliation and eradication of perceptual and ergonomic incompatibilities. The contrivances of the body are quite literally built into the blueprints and specifications of any technical device or assemblage (the arrangement of keys, hands-free usability), just as the body is manoeuvred and disciplined by the procedures of the apparatus ('typing' with the thumb, the 'space-making' or 'blue-toothing' on-the-mobile pedestrian). Of medium specific and phenomenological interest here is the extent to which ergonomic and stylistic differences in the design of handsets and mobile devices – the material 'contours' of the mobile medium itself – impact upon the body-tool relation, and thus upon our apprehension and experience of (tele)presence, (techno)space, intercorporeality and sociotechnical agency.

There seems little doubt that the mobile device's delivery of peripatetic yet present-at-hand communication and interactive media content has evoked a number of altered medium-specific ways of being-in-the-world. The dual consequences of ubiquitous wireless connectivity and media rendered miniaturised and portable impacts directly on our experience of the everyday, and transforms urban and city environments as media- or technospaces, reworking our agency, (inter)activity and bodily movement within and through them. The 'sensing' of mobile communication and interactive media elicits an intimately audio, visual, sometimes haptic, 'handy' and visceral awareness, a mode of embodiment which demands the ontological coincidence of distance and closeness, presence and telepresence, actual and virtual. In this article I have offered some initial ideas prefiguring a more complex somatics of mobile media, primarily in the context of the mobile phone, but there is much more to be done in the larger project on the techno-corporeal effects of various pocket media and portable devices in their specificity. In addition to mobile phones, this research will conduct an ethno-phenomenology of mobile media use in urban Western Australia, including sophisticated multimedia hybrids, personal digital assistants and entertainment devices, and handheld networkable game consoles. Yet as I have suggested, the emergent agencies and relations will not be considered the remarkable consequences of a brand new merger with high technology ex nihilo; rather, they will be interpreted as remediational 'gatherings' amidst numerous other technosoma, and as further instances of our inherently mutable ontologies.

Author's Biography

Ingrid Richardson is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Media Communication and Culture at Murdoch University. Her research interests include philosophy of technology and science, phenomenology of new media, and corporeal feminism.
Notes

[1] Sadie Plant was commissioned by Motorola in 2003 to carry out a study on the global use of mobile phone and the user-habits to emerge from increased mobile phone uptake.

[2] An important area of inquiry which will not be discussed here is the field of game studies, which to date has largely focused on the generation of avatars, the player-character relation, multi-player platforms, narrative content and interactive environments within the virtual microworlds of computer and TV-console games (Aarseth, 2003; Wolf and Perron, 2003). That is, there has been little attention paid to the phenomenology of mobile handheld games, the impact of physical mobility on gaming in offline and online modes, and the particular sense of transmediatic space, place and community that they generate. This is an important area of study given the proliferation of handheld games and hybrid game-phone handsets for the adult market. As such, the larger project aims to critically examine the ludic, embodied and technospatial specificity of portable and handheld game decks which has thus far escaped sustained analysis.

[3] Plant notes that 'artists have explored the creative possibilities of mobile speech. In the UK, Robin Rimbaud, known as Scanner and sometimes referred to as the "telephone terrorist," has produced soundscapes featuring snippets of mobile conversations. In the US, Chicago-based poet William Gillespie has composed poetry based on eavesdropped mobile transmissions, and another artist, Spacewurm, has made music from scanned mobiles and used them as the basis of a book' (Plant, 2003: 48).

[4] 'Producing Interactive TV', Australian Film Television and Radio School Seminar, Sydney, Australia, August 2002. Robertson and Mayfield produced Fat Cow Motel as an Australia-based 'multimedium platform space'. Comprised as a whodunit in thirteen half-hour episodes, FCM allowed its viewers or 'players' to interact with the narrative by participating in games and following clues in order to solve a series of mysteries. These clues were distributed through multiple platforms such as interactive TV via Austar, dedicated websites, SMS, voicemail and email, and viewers could follow the narrative either on broadcast TV or online. In the particular context of the mobile phone, viewers could enter coded passwords in order to 'eavesdrop' on the phone conversations of key characters in the series.
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above copied from: http://journal.fibreculture.org/issue6/issue6_richardson.html

Sunday, April 20, 2008

Oral Knowledge, Typographic Knowledge, Electronic Knowledge: Speculations on the History of Ownership, Doug Brent


by Doug Brent; Faculty of General Studies; University of Calgary; DABrent@UNCAMULT Faculty of General Studies University of Calgary Calgary, Alta, Canada T2N-1N4

1. Using Transformation Theory

It has frequently been observed that computers are revolutionizing the concept of knowledge ownership. Old standards of copyright and the ownership of intellectual property simply do not apply to the universe of knowledge in cyberspace. In this article I wish to examine more closely the ways in which concepts of intellectual property are changing as the computer changes our relationship to knowledge.
The main tool I wish to use in this investigation is the cluster of theories that Michael Heim has dubbed "transformation theory" (Electric Language 1987). Marshall McLuhan first called attention to the transforming powers of media in his insightful and infuriating books, particularly his masterpiece Understanding Media (1964). In that book, he claims that we cannot learn anything of importance about a medium by looking only at its content:
Our conventional response to all media, namely that it is how they are used that counts, is the numb stance of the technological idiot. For the "content" of a medium is like the juicy piece of meat carried by the burglar to distract the watchdog of the mind. (p. 18)

To avoid that numbness, we must refocus our attention on the ways in which the technological characteristics of the medium itself reshape our lives not just by giving us new tools to play with but by reshaping our consciousness on a fundamental and subliminal level.

In Orality and Literacy (1982), Walter Ong builds on McLuhan's general philosophy, plus anthropological research on the development of oral societies, in order to explain the dramatic changes in society that came about with the advent of literacy. Ong argues that the shift from oral to literate culture in about the fifth century B.C. did more than change patterns of art, politics and commerce. It enabled a profound shift in human conscious, bringing about the linear, abstract forms of Western logic that we take for granted today but which were simply unthinkable without literacy as a means of preserving complicated original thought. [line 42]

What makes transformation theory a particularly powerful tool for speculating on the impact of computers is that the information revolution intuitively feels like a third stage in this process, a revolution as great as the shift from orality to literacy. Admittedly, Heim warns severely against extending the transformation theory developed to deal with the first revolution and facilely using it to predict the outcome of the second:
Because it is anchored in the difference between orality and literacy, the transformation theory is unsuited for an investigation of word processing. Constant reference to the emergence of literacy distorts the phenomenon by reducing the emergence of word processing to a new kind of literacy. The use of the metaphor from print culture is understandable when we are confronted by the profound novelty of digital writing. But if we lose sight of the weakness of the metaphor, we shall pass right by the phenomenon in our anxiety to treat it easily in a familiar, conventionally manageable way. (p. 113)

Heim's warning is well taken; the second shift is neither simply an extension, nor simply a reversal (despite what I am about to argue) of the first. Yet if historical study is to be justified on any grounds other than idle curiosity, it surely must be on the grounds that we can learn something about the present and future by extrapolating from the past. The important caveat is that we must not depend only on a metaphor. To the extent that we see echoes of the first communications revolution in the second, we must be careful to use the metaphor of the first transformation only as a means of generating suggestive possibilities. Before we can rely on these suggestions even provisionally, we must corroborate them by close examination of changes in personal and social behaviour that are already sufficiently far along to be susceptible of examination.

2. Ownership of Knowledge in Oral Societies

Ong claims that in a primary oral culture--that is, a culture that has never known literacy--knowledge is not owned; rather it is performed. Without print, knowledge must be stored not as a set of abstract ideas or isolated bits of information, but as a set of concepts embedded deeply in the language and culture of the people. Strictly procedural knowledge--how to build a boat, how to fight a war--is passed on directly from craftsman to craftsman through the process of apprenticeship. However, the more abstract knowledge of the tribe--not just their history but also their values, their concepts of justice and social order--is contained in the epic formulae, recurrent themes, and mythic patterns, plots and stereotypes out of which the storytellers of the tribe weave their narratives. This knowledge exists as a pre-existing network of knowledge, interconnected in extraordinarily complex and non-linear ways and all known in at least its broad outlines to the storyteller's audience before he begins (see Bolter, Writing Space, 1991). [line 91]
Lord's work with modern illiterate poets underlines the implications of this means of transmitting knowledge (The Singer of Tales, 1960). Although the storytellers usually insist that they tell their stories exactly the same way each time, transcriptions of stories told by modern oral storytellers reveal significant variation. Rather than memorizing a verbatim "text," as literate observers assumed, the storytellers fit stock elements to a rhythmic pattern and a well-known plot to re- produce the story anew each time it is told. There simply is no "text" apart from each individual incarnation of each tale.

This has implications for how the creative act is seen. If oral performers were simply memorizing and reciting a work that had at one time been "composed" by a single individual, the process would be no more than an oral version of literate composition, in which a text is composed once and reproduced mechanically many times. But Lord's work reveals that the performer of a tale is combining an act of creation with an act of transmission. His primary work is to transmit the culture of the tribe, and in this act of transmission he must be conservative. Changes in oral knowledge cannot be undone, for there are no old copies to go back to. The tellers must therefore be able to reproduce the forms and plots in which their tribe's knowledge is contained as faithfully as possible. Yet there is also a gradual drift in the stories. In a process that Ong calls "homeostasis," the stories change imperceptibly over time to suit the needs and values of the culture as that culture changes. If the values that are held in high regard by the culture shift to suit changing circumstances, the heroes in the tales will acquire new characteristics, or even cease to be heroes. Individual creativity is profoundly rhetorical, for it is the subtle interplay between teller and audience that shapes the tales to match the values of that audience; yet it is also largely invisible (Ong 1982).

[line 120] This inseparability of creativity and performance meant that there was no such thing as ownership of knowledge--or, more aptly, there was no such thing as private ownership of knowledge. Knowledge was held in common, entrusted to the tellers of tales who were maintained by the tribe, not for their individual contributions to the growth of ideas, but for their ongoing duty to keep knowledge alive by performing it.

3. Ownership of Knowledge in Literate Societies

With the introduction of writing, all of this changed. According to Ong and his anthropological school of communications history, writing had a number of profound effects, including the development of the self-conscious, rational self, of the power of abstraction, and consequently of the entire Western system of logic. For my purposes here, however, the most important result of the invention of writing was a separation of text and performance, of knowledge and knower. As Havelock puts it in Origins of Western Literacy (1976), writing separates "the knower from the known" by creating a fossilized text that can achieve a continued existence apart from any knower. The knowledge represented by an oral tale is so embedded in mind and action that it cannot be contemplated as a separate entity; such knowledge travels as an almost subliminal partner of a performance, as transmission that the performer does not even think of as "knowledge" but rather as simply a set of actions. A manuscript, however, can be handled, stored, retrieved from a vault and re-performed a millennium after all previous readers have died. Therefore, with writing knowledge comes to be seen as something reified, as existing outside the self.
If knowledge can be separated from the knower, it can be owned by separate individuals. In an oral culture, plagiarism is unthinkable, simply because the survival of the culture depends on plagiarism--that is, on each performer learning what has gone before and making it his own. As the manuscript society came into existence, it became more common to attribute written tales to their sources in prior texts. Yet, as any student of early written poetry will know (Chaucer is a well-known example), prior texts were often so inseparably mingled with new material that generations of scholars have been kept happily employed in sorting them out. During the manuscript age, the painstaking copying and illustrating of a manuscript was in some respects a personal performance of knowledge analogous to the performance of an epic poem or folk tale.

[line 160] It was the printing press that made private ownership of knowledge a necessity, for it was the printing press that finally severed the connection between the creation and the transmission of knowledge. For transmission was now a mechanical act, performable by a machine. Originality, once a deadly danger to a society that had to struggle to maintain its equilibrium, could now be seen as more valuable than performance. To claim originality for what was only a re-performance became a serious breach of the values of the society. Appropriating another's ideas, once an essential means of keeping them alive, became the act of a plagiarius, a torturer, plunderer, oppressor:

Typography had made the word a commodity. The old communal oral world had split up into privately claimed freeholdings. The drift toward greater individualism had been served well by print. (Ong 1982, p. 131)
Copyright laws were soon created as a means of preserving this intellectual property. As Patterson points out (Copyright in Historical Perspective 1968), copyright was originally created more as a means of breaking the stationers' monopoly on texts than as a means of protecting authors' rights. Yet the commonsense notion that an author's words were things of countable value pressed the law of copyright further and further in the direction of articulating those rights against those of the stationers who simply reproduced the physical text. By the eighteenth century, copyright was firmly established not only as a means to ensure that an author will be paid for his ideas, but also to ensure that he will be able to protect their integrity by granting him the sole authority to correct, amend or retract them. In the Miller vs. Taylor decision of 1767, a decision vital to the shaping of English copyright law into its final modern form, Mr. Justice Aston commented, "I do not know, nor can I comprehend any property more emphatically a man's own, nay, more incapable of being mistaken, than his literary works" (Patterson p. 170).

The modern abhorrence of plagiarism, of course, has never meant that one should not use another's ideas. The practice of bringing ideas forward and integrating them into later works is fundamental to the modern belief that knowledge is cumulative and improvable. But a crucial difference between oral and literate diffusion of knowledge is that as knowledge diffuses through knowledge networks of modern research disciplines, it leaves behind the tracks of its passage in the form of earlier texts linked by webs of citations. Among other functions, these citations ensure that the producer of a particularly fertile idea is given due credit for her work, even as that work is being corrected, amended, extended, and ultimately submerged into the new knowledge that is being built upon it. Whereas the oral bard could demonstrate that he was earning his keep simply by continually re-performing the knowledge of which he was guardian, the modern researcher must demonstrate that she is worthy of being maintained by her tribe by creating work worthy of being explicitly cited by others. Thus she retains ownership of the ideas at the same time as she releases them into the world to perform their work--in a sense leasing rather than transferring them to others. [line 209]

Thus the effects of printed texts are somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, the explicit pointers to earlier texts reinforce the fact that knowledge is built communally, through the interactions of thousands of individuals. On the other hand, the fact that each idea can be labelled with the name of its maker has created the romantic myth of the individual creative genius. This myth manifests itself in the arts as the figure of the brooding artist creating in solitude, and in the sciences as the individual inventor, the Nobel prize winner who sees what no-one has seen before.

4. Ownership of Knowledge in Cyberspace

In this context, then, what might the second shift, from print to the electronic space afforded by word processing, computer conferencing, and hypertext, do to our sense of the ownership of knowledge?
One of the most important features of typography, if we believe McLuhan and his followers, is metaphorical. Here we are not talking about the investigator's use of metaphor to extend the past into the future, the metaphor that Heim is so reluctant to pursue. We are talking about an entire culture's metaphorical transfer of characteristics of its communications medium to other aspects of the culture. McLuhan suggests, for instance, that the reproduction of texts from straight rows of exactly repeatable, individually meaningless units of type is an amazingly close analogue of, and perhaps the model for, the specialized industrial society in which an entire economy is assembled out of small bits of individually owned private property--including intellectual property. These sorts of speculation can be taken to the giddy heights of unprovable assertion that McLuhan is justly derided for. Yet if we accept provisionally that the medium can sometimes be the metaphor, we can perhaps learn something about the effects of the second transformation by looking at the metaphorical ways in which it allows us to conceptualize knowledge.

[line 241] One of the most important ways in which the electronic metaphor operates is not so much to change what writers do when they build knowledge, but rather to make this process more immediately and more obviously visible through the types of operations which it allows and the physical steps which the writer goes through. It has, after all, been observed for some time that the myth of the individual discoverer of knowledge is exactly that--a myth. Perhaps the best summary of this literature is Karen Burke LeFevre's Invention as a Social Act (1987), a work that brings together accounts of collaborative invention from postmodern literary theory, language philosophy and social psychology to argue for a new emphasis on collaboration by writing teachers. One of the most important of these sources is Michel Foucault:
[Foucault] describes the beginning of a discourse as a re-emergence into an ongoing, never-ending process: "At the moment of speaking, I would like to have perceived a nameless voice, long preceding me, leaving me merely to enmesh myself in it. . . . There would have been no beginnings: instead, speech would proceed from me, while I stood in its path--a slender gap--the point of its possible disappearance." Elaborating on this perspective, one may come to regard discourse not as an isolated event, but rather a constant potentiality that is occasionally evidenced in speech or writing. . . . Such perspectives suggest that traditional views of an event or act have been misleading when they have presumed that the individual unit--a speech or a written text, an individual hero, a particular battle or discovery--is clearly separable from a larger, continuing force or stream of events in which it participates. For similar reasons Jacques Derrida has criticized literary theories that attempt to explain the meaning of a text apart from other texts that precede and follow it. (p. 41-42)

Sociologists of science support this conception of knowledge as communal rather than individual. Diana Crane's seminal study Invisible Colleges (1972), for instance, documents the extent to which ideas are nourished and developed through networks of interaction among scientists who may come from many different "official" disciplines but who form a powerful social group around a common problem. Yet the print technology through which this communally-developed knowledge is typically delivered-- distanced, fossilized, abstracted from the network of interconnected minds that formed it--continually enforces the opposite message. The metaphorical meaning of print technology is isolation, not communality. In particular, the ability to claim one's particular share of the intertextual web and stamp it with one's own name--an ability made possible by the same printing press that made widespread cumulation of knowledge possible as well--suggests that knowledge is individually owned. [line 290]

I believe that computer mediated communication provides a totally different metaphorical message, one that can take theories of collaborative knowledge out of the realm of language philosophy and stamp them indelibly in the consciousness of the entire society. Let us begin by looking at what is now the most mundane aspect of computer-mediated communication, word processing. Remember that one of the most important psychological effects of writing in general and the printing press in particular is the fossilization of text as an exteriorized object. However, composing on a word processor divides the production of the text into two distinct stages. Ultimately the text issues in a final stage of more or less complete closure, once a "final" draft is published in a hard codex. But the word processor greatly extends the fluid stage of text, abolishing the sense of discrete drafts and smaller divisible units (pages) and turning the text into a long continuous document, a scroll examined through a twenty-five line sliding window. Although this small window can be a problem for students who cannot always visualize the entire text as a unit (see for instance Richard Collier, "The Word Processor and Revision Strategies," 1983), expert writers generally lose their dependence on what they can see on the screen and internalize the sense of a text that exists in an infinitely mutable state. Even the printout, apparently hard and immutable, comes to be seen as purely provisional, for a new one incorporating changes can be produced at whim.

A key aspect of this form of text is that it can easily be recombined with other texts. Skilled writers who use word processors are well aware of how often they cannibalize their own older texts for quotations, well-turned paragraphs, ideas cut out of drafts and saved for future works in which they might be more appropriate. But this effect does not become truly significant until the writer's own text begins to interact with other sources of text available on-line. The word processor is often seen as a preliminary stage of conferencing, for posted text is often prepared initially on some kind of word processor (whether PC or mainframe editor). However, this metaphor can be reversed: the word processor is coming to be fed by on-line information as much as the reverse. As other sources of text become available in machine-readable format--texts received through electronic conferences and on-line publications, texts downloaded from databases, et cetera--the awareness of intertextuality that LeFevre speaks of becomes increasingly objectified, its implications increasingly unmistakable. [line 328]

As I prepare this article I am conscious of two kinds of sources. Some of the sources came to me in hard copy; the labour of typing quotations in by hand, of leafing through separate texts to identify key passages, for me emphasises their separateness, the claim of the original author over the knowledge. Other sources came to me electronically; these I can cut and paste into my document much more freely, integrating not just another's words but ultimately his very keystrokes into my own construct. A well-trained scholar, I am always careful to acknowledge, always careful not to place my own stamp of ownership on the words of another. But the sliding together of texts in the electronic writing space, texts no longer available as discrete units but as continuous fields of ideas and information, is so much easier in electronic space--not just physically easier but psychologically more natural-- that it is significantly more effort to keep the ownership of the ideas separate. Intertextuality, once a philosophical concept, is becoming a way of life.

When information becomes disseminated electronically, not only pretexts but also posttexts begin to slide more and more fluidly into the text as the author integrates the comments of others into the evolving document. As Hiltz and Turoff put it in The Network Nation (1978),
The distinction between a draft, preprint, publication or reprint now turns into the same "paper" or set of information, merely modified by the author as he or she builds on the comments from the readership. (p. 276)

Ultimately the distinctions between authors and documents may break down completely. Hiltz and Turoff separate sections of their book The Network Nation with fanciful excerpts from a future "Boshwash Times"; one of these (from the July 14, 1995 issue) predicts just such a breakdown of individual authorship under the pressure of computer mediated collaboration:
A group of 57 social and information scientists today shared the Nobel Prize in economics, while 43 physicists and scholars in other disciplines captured the prize in physics. . . . When the first such collective prize was announced eight years ago, the committee tried to convince the group involved to name the two or three of its members who were the most responsible for the theory developed. However, the group insisted that this was impossible. Dr. Andrea Turoff, spokesperson for the collective, explained "We were engaged in what we call a `synologue'--a process in which the synthesis of the dialogue stimulated by the group process creates something that would not be possible otherwise." (pp. 464-65) [line 374]

In short, with electronic communication the notion of the static and individually owned text dissolves back into the communally performed fluidity of the oral culture. When the materials of which they are constructed are available in machine- readable form, document assembly--a very telling neologism-- becomes analogous to the oral poet boilerplating stock phrases and epithets into familiar plots, reaching into the previously existing network of epic knowledge to create a new instantiation of knowledge that has been in the public domain from before his birth (see Bolter, Writing Space, 1991). In the electronic world as in the oral, the latent intertextuality of print is raised to consciousness: it becomes more obvious that originality lies not so much in the individual creation of elements as in the performance of the whole composition.

There is boilerplating and boilerplating, of course. As he weaves his stories, the oral storyteller is deeply embedded in a rhetorical and cultural context. His audience is physically before him, and he assembles his stories in a close engagement with both that audience and his characters, the tribal ground out of which his figure arises. "The individual's reaction is not expressed as simply individual or `subjective' but rather as encased in the communal reaction, the communal `soul'" (Ong, 1982, p. 46). On the other hand, certain kinds of machine boilerplating, augmented by such mnemonic aids as CD-Rom's containing thousands of form letters and mail-merge programs with which to distribute them blindly, can become so totally divorced from rhetorical occasion that they cease to have any connection with human knowledge whatsoever (Cragg, "The Technologizing of Rhetoric," 1991). But a process is best defined not by its pathological extremes but by the central uses to which a society puts it. When used by skilled writers who are writing in a rhetorical context, not just recopying formulae in a vacuum, the relatively easy cut-and-paste embedding of chunks of prose from various sources can become an important operational metaphor of intertextual connections. Language theorists have always assured us that these connections exist, but we used not to see them so objectively demonstrated. [line 407]

5. Living Mythically in Cyberspace

McLuhan's term for the effects of electronic communication is "retribalization." Under the effects of participatory electronic media, he claims, linear typographic man again learns to "live mythically." McLuhan of course never explains precisely what he means by these or any other of his terms--to do so would spoil the fun of making the reader write her own meanings into McLuhan's text. But the concept of living "mythically" suggests far more than simply being more interconnected, of being able to send messages to each other more quickly and easily than we could last year. It means living in a form of consciousness in which knowledge does not exist outside the knower, embodied in a physical text, but instead is lived dramatically, communally performed as the myths of oral man were performed. This, I argue, will be--to some extent already is--one of the effects of internalizing the electronic writing space.
These effects are at their peak in hypertext, undoubtedly the most extreme example of text that is both nonlinear and participatory. The constructive processes performed by any reader of any text find a very physical analogue in hypertext as each reader takes a different physical path from node to node and thus metaphorically "rewrites" the text in the process of reading it. Hypertext documents can be constructed as even more open systems, in which each reader is invited to become co-author by adding new nodes or new information within nodes (Slatin 1990). As Moulthrop puts it,
At the kernel of the hypertext concept lie ideas of affiliation, correspondence, and resonance. In this, . . . hypertext is nothing more than an extension of what literature has always been (at least since "Tradition and the Individual Talent")--a temporally extended network of relations which successive generations of readers and writers perpetually make and unmake. (1991, par. 19) [line 438]

Hypertext is still too new and relatively rare to be the object of much close study, although it has created a great deal of interesting informed speculation (see in particular Bolter 1991). It can be seen, as Slatin does, as a very different form of text, the only form of computer mediated communication that is entirely unique to the computer and has no analogue in hard-copy communication whatever. For my purposes, however, I do not think that we need to separate hypertext from other forms of computer mediated communication. Rather, I see it as simply the most extreme extension of a change in communications media that permeates all aspects of the electronic writing space.

6. Copyright in the Cybernetic Tribe

One of the most visible signs of the first transformation of consciousness was, as I have noted, the development of copyright laws to safeguard intellectual property. It is not difficult to speculate on what could happen to these laws if the computer really does change our attitude to knowledge. We can understand this change not by postulating a simple reversal, but by invoking a more complex concept: McLuhan's "break boundary," the point at which anything, pushed to its limit, breaks into a new form that is in many respects its opposite. Mechanical duplication, once so easy that it separated performance from creation and brought about copyright to protect the latter, has now become so very easy that copyright, in the sense of a prohibition on unauthorized copying, is virtually meaningless. Small software companies distribute their products as shareware; large ones have given up on copy-protection schemes and are hoping to make enough money on site licences to corporations to make up for the rampant piracy of individuals. The sense of a single original--an author's draft, a frame of set type, a master copy--becomes increasingly difficult to sustain in an environment in which every copy can spawn another copy at a keystroke, without loss of physical quality. "In magnetic code," Michael Heim points out, "there are no originals" (1987, p. 162). In the intellectual marketplace in particular, copyright in the sense of preventing unauthorized copying is becoming vacuous--hence the bold statement in the EJournal masthead that "permission is hereby granted to give it away."
Even the sense of owning a document to protect its integrity is becoming difficult to maintain as documents lose the physical markers that hitherto anchored their boundaries in time and space. In order to own a document, Hiltz and Turoff (1978) note, [line 478]
An author has to be able to own one item, which may appear in many different places which may change dramatically over time, and the author might alter his item after it is already in the system. Delivering copies of the item to the copyright office whenever it is changed, or a copy of each and every "publication" of it, is going to lead to chaos. (p. 456)

Thus copyright in the sense of securing the rights to a fixed entity is likely doomed. The only sense in which copyright can continue to have meaning in electronic space is the sense of acknowledging an original creator of an idea. Electronic documents have not done away with the citation network, and even in an evolving hypertext, newly created nodes are typically stamped with date and author (Slatin, "Reading Hypertext," 1991). But these familiar gestures are beginning to mean something different in electronic space. To acknowledge parentage is not the same as to maintain a claim of ownership. Without the sense of master-and-duplicate that the printing press imposed, there is no intellectual ground for present attempts to toughen copyright laws in order to protect "intellectual property." They are like holding a sieve under a breaking dam.

We can see signs of this shift in a number of subtle and not-so-subtle ways. In a previous issue of this journal, for instance, Robert K. Lindsay (1991) proposes an electronic journal of proposed research in which research proposals would be openly critiqued by any readers of the journal who felt qualified to do so, in the hope of improving them through the process of open debate ("Electronic Journals of Proposed Research," 1991). In a sense this is no more than an extension and formalization of the oral stage of collaboration, a stage that now occurs in a less formal way in the halls and coffee rooms of research and educational institutions, and late at night in the overpriced hotel rooms of rumpled researchers at conferences. But Lindsay does not suggest simply that proposals should be publicly posted for critiquing. He also proposes that "These proposals would then be in the public domain: they could be carried out by anyone with the means and skill, or they could be referred to in applications to funding agencies." For the proposer, this means not simply putting an idea out into the world for a time to see what improvements could be made to it. It means surrendering ownership of the idea forever, possibly letting another person develop and reap the academic rewards for it. This is an idea that could just as easily have been proposed in the context of a print journal of proposals--but I have never seen it done. When knowledge inhabits a print space, it seems natural to want to own it. When it enters electronic space, it seems equally natural to surrender it. [line 521]

7. Caveats and Conclusions

Before announcing a complete reversal of typographically- dominated consciousness, I want to make explicit a few notes of caution hinted at earlier. First, one must realize that analogy is a particularly slippery form of reasoning. Seeing history as merely circular without recognizing key differences is as reductive as it is tempting. By electronic media, McLuhan meant electronic mass media such as film, radio and most importantly television, media largely free of alphabetic text. It is not at all clear that computer mediated communication will have the effects that McLuhan claims for other forms of electronic media. The electronic revolution, despite its often-cited links with orality, may be returning us not to a secondary form of orality so much as to a secondary form of literacy from which earlier forms of audio-visual media had begun to alienate us. Stuart Moulthrop points out that, however much an electronic text may be freed by its electronic form from many of the constraints of print text, it is still text, still visual, still segmented and sequential in its smaller units if not in its larger structure ("You Say You Want a Revolution? Hypertext and the Laws of Media," 1991). That secondary literacy is different from primary literacy does not make it equatable to primary orality. As Ong points out, primary orality is characterised not by a different concept of text but by an absence of the very concept of text itself.
In particular, structures of thought in primary orality are pressured by the relentless need to preserve knowledge against the threat of annihilation by the ever-decaying properties of sound. The textual recombinations performed by the oral bard were subtle, driven by the needs of the audience but minute enough to preserve the illusion that each retelling of the story was the same. As electronic text breaks up the fixity of print, knowledge will not return to this endless reperformance of the same patterned phrases, for the elements of the text are preserved in a form that, while infinitely malleable, need never be changed. Unoppressed by the forces of decay that drove tribal symbolizers, the electronic symbolizer is free to remake texts as creatively as desired.
Elements in the electronic writing space are not simply chaotic; they are instead in a perpetual state of reorganization. They perform patterns, constellations, which are in constant danger of breaking down and combining into new patterns. (Bolter, 1991, p. 9) [line 561]

Here we may recognise the communality of oral knowledge, the close union of the knower and the known, but for all that we cannot recognize primary orality. We can never get all the way back there again.

Moreover, given the economic structure that we have painstakingly built on the back of print-induced linearity and specialization, it will take more than a new attitude toward texts to make us stop wanting to charge for knowledge. In fact, the very technology that has made certain aspects of replication so easy as to make old-fashioned copyright unenforceable has simultaneously brought into existence new possibilities of charging by the byte for using information--a process that Moulthrop calls "information capitalism" (1991, par. 16). For every move in the economic game there is a countermove, and knowledge has been so closely tied to economics for so long that it may never be dislodged. Rather, the relationship between economics and knowledge will be rearranged into new formations, some perhaps more sinister than my rather optimistic portrait of communal knowing has suggested.

Finally, I do not want to exaggerate the degree or speed with which changes such as I have outlined are likely to penetrate the society as a whole. Eisenstein is careful to point out that the effects of the printing press not only took a long time to diffuse through Europe, but initially only affected a relatively small elite that she dubbed the new "reading public" (The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, 1979). The effects on the larger public were more on the order of secondary effects, though none the less profound for that. We in the academic community tend at times to forget that there actually are people in the world who do not have a desk covered with books, papers, half-done projects, computer disks and banana peels. Computers have penetrated everyone's world to the extent that almost every Western household has dozens of appliances that contain a silicon chip, and nearly every business transaction is in some way or another involved with a computer. But this is not the same as saying that everyone is likely has experienced or is soon likely to experience first-hand the new consciousness of text that I have been describing. As with the printing press, so with the computer, the effects that diffuse beyond the realm of the knowledge workers themselves may be of a highly secondary nature. But again, their secondariness will not mean triviality.

[line 598] I want to be careful, then, to define the limits of the claim I am making here. I am not claiming that electronic text will unilaterally undo almost three millennia of exposure to literacy. I am suggesting, however, that some of its psychological effects can be understood in part by referring to the state of consciousness that existed before writing in general and the printing press in particular made it possible to separate the knower from the known, to see knowledge as a commodity that can be owned, traded, rented, and accumulated. The new awareness of the "polylogic" nature of our knowledge (to borrow Michael Joyce's term), an awareness that has percolated through such diverse disciplines as literary criticism, rhetoric, language philosophy and cognitive science, may well have a technological basis. The sort of surrender of ownership suggested by Lindsay's proposal may be more thinkable in an electronic form than in a printed form, not just because electronic media speed up the dialogue, but because electronic media make the dialogic aspect of language overt and inescapable. The long standing process of trading texts back and forth becomes transformed into a process of merging texts into new wholes which are inseparable from their makers. The modern researcher will never be metaphorphosed into Homeric bard, but perhaps at least some of her activities can be seen as more bardic now than they could under the linear metaphors imposed by print.

References

Bolter, J. (1991). Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing. Fairlawn, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Collier, R. M. (1983). The word processor and revision strategies. College Composition and Communication, 34, 134-35.
Cragg, G. (1991). The technologizing of rhetoric. Paper delivered at the Canadian Communications Association Convention, Kingston, Ontario, May 30, 1991.
Crane, Diana. (1972). Invisible colleges: The diffusion of knowledge in scientific communities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Eisenstein, E. (1979). The printing press as an agent of [line 639] change: Communications and cultural transformation in early modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Havelock, E. (1976). Origins of western literacy. Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education.
Heim, M. (1987). Electric language: A philosophical study of word processing. Yale: Yale University Press.
Hiltz, S. R., and Turoff, T. (1978). The network nation. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.
LeFevre, K. B. (1987). Invention as a social act Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Lindsay, Robert K. (1991). Electronic journals of proposed research. EJournal 1.1. (EJournal@ALBNYVMS).
Lord, A. (1960). The singer of tales. Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature, 24. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding media: The extensions of man. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Moulthrop, S. (1991). "You say you want a revolution? Hypertext and the laws of media." Postmodern Culture, 1, no. 3. (Moulthrop 591; Listserv@NCSUVM.BITNET).
Ong, W. (1982). Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the word. New York: Methuen.
Patterson, L. R. (1968). Copyright in historical perspective. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
Slatin, J. M. (1990). "Reading Hypertext: Order and coherence in a new medium." College English, 52, 870-883.

above copied from: http://www.virtualschool.edu/mon/Economics/BrentHistoryOfOwnership.html

Friday, January 25, 2008

Baudrillard: A New McLuhan? Douglas Kellner

Homepage: http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/kellner.html
Curriculum Vitae: http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/DK97CV.htm

During the 1980s, Jean Baudrillard has been promoted in certain circles as the new McLuhan, as the most advanced theorist of the media and society in the so-called postmodern era.[1] His theory of a new, postmodern society rests on a key assumption that the media, simulations, and what he calls "cyberblitz" constitute a new realm of experience and a new stage of history and type of society. To a large extent, Baudrillard's work consists in rethinking radical social theory and politics in the light of developments of the consumer, media, information, and technological society. Baudrillard's earlier works focus on the construction of the consumer society and how it provides a new world of values, meaning, and activity, and thus inhabit the terrain of Marxism and political economy. From the mid-1970s on, however, reflections on political economy and the consumer society disappear almost completely from his texts, and henceforth simulations and simulacra, media and information, science and new technologies, and implosion and hyperreality become the constituents of a new postmodern world which -- in his theorizing -- obliterate all the boundaries, categories, and values of the previous forms of industrial society while establishing new forms of social organization, thought, and experience.

Among Baudrillard's most provocative theses are his reflections on the role of the media in constituting the postmodern world. Indeed, he provides paradigmatic models of the media as all-powerful and autonomous social forces which produce a wide range of effects.[2] To explicate the development and contours of his positions on the media, I shall follow his reflections from the late 1960s to the present, and sort out what I consider to be his contributions and limitations. I shall also be concerned to delineate the political implications of his media theory and to point to alternative theoretical and political perspectives on the media.

Baudrillard's Postmodern Media Theory

In 1967, Baudrillard wrote a review of Marshall McLuhan's _Understanding Media_ in which he claimed that McLuhan's dictum that the "medium is the message" is "the very formula of alienation in a technical society," and he criticized McLuhan for naturalizing that alienation.[3] At this time, he shared the neo-Marxian critique of McLuhan as a technological reductionist and determinist. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, McLuhan's formula eventually became the guiding principle of his own thought.

Baudrillard begins developing his theory of the media in an article "Requiem for the Media" in _Toward a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign_ (1972). The title is somewhat ironic for Baudrillard is really only beginning to develop a social theory in which the media will play crucial roles in constituting a new postmodernity. Thus Baudrillard is really writing a requiem here for a 'Marxist theory of the media' arguing: "McLuhan has said, with his usual Canadian-Texan brutalness, that Marx, the spiritual contemporary of the steam engine and railroads, was already obsolete in his lifetime with the appearance of the telegraph. In his candid fashion, he is saying that Marx, in his materialist analysis of production, had virtually circumscribed productive forces as a privileged domain from which language, signs and communication in general found themselves excluded" (CPES, p. 164). Baudrillard's critique of Marx here begins a radical interrogation of and eventual break with Marxism which would culminate in _The Mirror of Production_ (1973). Baudrillard begins distancing himself from Marxism in "Requiem for the Media," and in particular attacks Marx's alleged economic reductionism, or "productivism," and the alleged inability of the Marxian theory to conceptualize language, signs, and communication (Habermas at the time was developing a parallel position within Critical Theory).[4]

As an example of the failure of Marxian categories to provide an adequate theory of the media, Baudrillard criticizes the German activist and writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger's media theory and his attempts to develop a socialist strategy for the media.[5] Baudrillard dismisses this effort as a typical Marxian attempt to liberate productive forces from the fetters of productive relations that fails to see that in their very form the mass media of communication "are anti-mediatory and intransitive. They fabricate non communication -- this is what characterizes them, if one agrees to define communication as an exchange, as a reciprocal space of a speech and a response, and thus of a responsibility (not a psychological or moral responsibility, but a personal, mutual correlation in exchange) .... they are what always prevents response, making all processes of exchange impossible (except in the various forms of response simulation, themselves integrated in the transmission process, thus leaving the unilateral nature of the communication intact). This is the real abstraction of the media. And the system of social control and power is rooted in it" (CPES, pp. 169-170).

It is curious that Baudrillard, interpreted by many of his followers as an avant-garde, postmodern media theorist, manifests in this passage both technophobia and a nostalgia for face-to-face conversation which he privileges (as authentic communication) over debased and abstract media communication. Such a position creates a binary dichotomy between "good" face-to-face communication and "bad" media communication, and thus occludes the fact that interpersonal communication can be just as manipulative, distorted, reified, and son on, as media communication (as Ionesco and Habermas, among others, were aware), while ruling out in advance the possibility of "responsible" or "emancipatory" media communication -- a point that I shall return to in conclusion.

In another study in the _Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign_, Baudrillard noted how the "TV Object" was becoming the center of the household and was serving an essential "proof function" that the owner was a genuine member of the consumer society (CPRES, pp. 53ff.). The accelerating role of the media in contemporary society is for Baudrillard equivalent to THE FALL into the postmodern society of simulations from the modern universe of production. Modernity for Baudrillard is thus the era of production characterized by the rise of industrial capitalism and the hegemony of the bourgeoisie while postmodern society is an era of simulation dominated by signs, codes, and models. Modernity thus centered on the production of things -commodities and products -- while postmodernity is characterized by radical semiurgy, by a proliferation of signs. Furthermore, following McLuhan, Baudrillard interprets modernity as a process of explosion of commodification, mechanization, technology, and market relations, while postmodern society is the site of an implosion of all boundaries, regions, and distinctions between high and low culture, appearence and reality, and just about every other binary opposition maintained by traditional philosophy and social theory. Furthermore, while modernity could be characterized as a process of increasing differentiation of spheres of life (Max Weber as interpreted by Habermas), postmodernity could be interpreted as a process of de-differentiation and attendent implosion.[6]

The rise of the broadcast media, especially television, is an important constituent of postmodernity for Baudrillard, along with the rapid dissemination of signs and simulacra in every realm of social and everyday life. By the late 1970s, Baudrillard interprets the media as key simulation machines which reproduce images, signs, and codes which constitute an autonomous realm of (hyper)reality and which come to play a key role in everyday life and the obliteration of the social.[7] Baudrillard's analyses of simulations and hyperreality probably constitute his most important contributions to social theory and media critique. During an era when movie actors simulate politics and charlatans simulate TV-religion the category of simulation provides an essential instrument of radical social critique, while the concept of hyperreality is also an extremely useful instrument of social analysis for a media, cybernetic, and information society.

Baudrillard's analyses point to a significant reversal of the relation between representation and reality. Previously, the media were believed to mirror, reflect, or represent reality, whereas now the media are coming to constitute a (hyper)reality, a new media reality -- "more real than real" -- where "the real" is subordinate to representation leading to an ultimate dissolving of the real. In addition, in "The Implosion of Meaning in the Media," Baudrillard claims that the proliferation of signs and information in the media obliterates meaning through neutralizing and dissolving all content -- a process which leads both to a collapse of meaning and the destruction of distinctions between media and reality. In a society supposedly saturated with media messages, information and meaning "implode," collapsing into meaningless "noise," pure effect without content or meaning. Thus, for Baudrillard: "information is directly destructive of meaning and signification, or neutralizes it. The loss of meaning is directly linked to the dissolving and dissuasive action of information, the media, and the mass media.... Information devours its own contents; it devours communication and the social.... information dissolves meaning and the social into a sort of nebulous state leading not at all to a surfeit of innovation but to the very contrary, to total entropy" (SSM, pp. 96-100).

Baudrillard uses here a model of the media as a black hole of signs and information which absorb all contents into cybernetic noise which no longer communicates meaningful messages in a process of implosion where all content implodes into form. We thus see here how Baudrillard eventually adopts McLuhan's media theory as his own, claiming that: "the medium is the message signifies not only the end of the message, but also the end of the medium. There are no longer media in the literal sense of the term (I am talking above all about the electronic mass media) -- that is to say, a power mediating between one reality and another, between one state of the real and another -- neither in content nor in form. Strictly speaking this is what implosion signifies: the absorption of one pole into another, the short-circuit between poles of every differential system of meaning, the effacement of terms and of distinct oppositions, and thus that of the medium and the real. Hence the impossibility of any mediation, of any dialectical intervention between the two or from one to the other, circularity of all media effects. Hence the impossibility of a sense (meaning), in the literal sense of a unilateral vector which leads from one pole to another. This critical -- but original -- situation must be thought through to the very end; it is the only one we are left with. It is useless to dream of a revolution through content or through form, since the medium and the real are now in a single nebulous state whose truth is undecipherable" (SSM, pp. 102-103).

In effect, Baudrillard is suggesting that the very project of developing a radical theory of the media is impossible because there really are no "media" in the sense of institutions and cultural machines mediating between dominant political and economic powers and the population below. He claims that the media and "reality" implode such that it is impossible to distinguish between media representations and the "reality" which they supposedly represent. Baudrillard also suggests that the media intensify massification by producing mass audiences and massification of ideas and experience. On the other hand, he claims that the masses absorb all media content, neutralize, or even resist, meaning, and demand and obtain more spectacle and entertainment, thus further eroding the boundary between media and "the real." In this sense, the media implode into the masses to an extent that it is unknowable what effects the media have on the masses and how the masses process the media.

Consequently, on this view, the media pander to the masses, reproducing their taste, their interest in spectacle and entertainment, their fantasies and way of life, producing an implosion between mass consciousness and media phantasmagoria. In this way, Baudrillard shortcircuits the manipulation theory which sees media manipulation imposed from above producing mass consciousness, yet he seems to share the contempt for the masses in standard manipulation theory claiming that they want nothing more than spectacle, diversion, entertainment and escape, and are incapable of, or uninterested in, producing meaning.

In any case, since the media and the masses liquidate meaning, it is meaningless to carry out ideological critiques of media messages since the "medium is the message" in the sense that media communication has no significant referents except its own images and noise which ceaselessly refer back and forth to other media images and spectacles. In _On Seduction_ (1979), Baudrillard utilizes McLuhan's distinction between "hot" and "cool" media to describe the ways that media devour information and exterminate meaning. According to Baudrillard, the media take "hot" events like sports, wars, political turmoil, catastrophes, etc. and transform them into "cool" media events, which he interprets as altogether another kind of event and experience. Concerning the difference between a televised and attended sports event, Baudrillard writes: "Do not believe that it is a matter of the same game: one is hot, the other is cool -- one is a contest where affect, challenge, mise en scene, and spectacle are present, whereas the other is tactile, modulated (visions in flash-back, replays, close-ups or overhead views, various angles, etc.): a televised sports event is above all a televised event, just as _Holocaust_ or the Vietnam war are televised events of which one can hardly make distinctions" (SED, p. 217).

For Baudrillard, eventually, all the dominant media become "cool," erasing McLuhan's (problematical) distinction between hot and cool media. That is, for Baudrillard all the media of information and communication neutralize meaning and involve the audience in a flat, one-dimensional media experience which he defines in terms of a passive absorption of images, or a resistance of meaning, rather than the active processing or production of meaning. The electronic media therefore on this account have nothing to do with myth, image, history, or the construction of meaning (or ideology). Television is interpreted instead as a media "which suggests nothing, which magnetises, which is only a screen, or is rather a miniaturized terminal which in fact is found immediately in your head -- you are the screen and the television is watching you. Television transistorizes all neurons and operates as a magnetic tape -- a tape not an image" (SED, p. 220).

Baudrillard, McLuhan and the Ecstasy of Communication

We see here how Baudrillard out-McLuhans McLuhan in interpreting television, and all other media, simply as technological forms, as machines which produce primarily technological effects in which content and messages, or social uses, are deemed irrelevant and unimportant. We also see how, like McLuhan, he anthropomorphizes the media ("the television is watching you"), a form of technological mysticism (or to be more nasty, mystification) as extreme as McLuhan. Like McLuhan, Baudrillard also globalizes media effects making the media demiurges of a new type of society and new type of experience.

Baudrillard also practices McLuhan's method of probes and mosaic constellations of images and concepts which take on an experimental and provisional nature. Consequently, whereas he sets forth theoretically articulated theses about the media in "Requiem," in his studies of simulations and later writings he tends to cluster images, concepts, and descriptive analyses, within which media often play a key role, rather than systematically articulating a well-defined theoretical position, thus adopting a key McLuhanite literary strategy.

Yet we might contrast here McLuhan's ecumenical Catholicism with Baudrillard's somewhat puritanical Protestantism.[8] McLuhan fantasized a new type of global community and even a new universal (media) consciousness and experience through the dissemination of a global media system, the global village. McLuhan also believed that the media could overcome alienation produced by the abstract rationality of book culture which was being replaced by a new synaesthesia and harmonizing of the mind and body, the senses and technologies. Baudrillard by contrast sees the media as external demigods, or idols of the mind -- to continue the Protestant metaphor --, which seduce and fascinate the subject and which enter subjectivity to produce a reified consciousness and privatized and fragmented life-style (Sartre's seriality). Thus while McLuhan ascribes a generally benign social destiny to the media, for Baudrillard the function of TV and mass media is to prevent response, to isolate and privatize individuals, and to trap them into a universe of simulacra where it is impossible to distinguish between the spectacle and the real, and where individuals come to prefer spectacle over "reality" (which both loses interest for the masses and its privileged status in philosophy and social theory).

The mass media are thus instruments for Baudrillard of a "cold seduction" whose narcissistic charm consists of a manipulative self-seduction in which we enjoy the play of lights, shadows, dots, and events in our own mind as we change channels or media and plug into the variety of networks -- media, computer, information -- that surround us and that allow us to become modulators and controllers of an overwhelming panoply of sights, sounds, information, and events. In this sense, media have a chilling effect (which is why Baudrillard allows McLuhan's "cool" to become downright "cold") which freeze individuals into functioning as terminals of media and communication networks who become involved as part and parcel of the very apparatus of communication. The subject, then, becomes transformed into an object as part of a nexus of information and communication networks.

The interiorization of media transmissions within the screen of our mind obliterates, he claims, the distinction between public and private, interior and exterior space -- both of which are replaced by media space. Here Baudrillard inverts McLuhan's thesis concerning the media as extensions of the human, as exteriorizations of human powers, and argues instead that humans internalize media and thus becomes terminals within media systems -- a new theoretical anti-humanism that might amuse Louis Althusser. The eye and the brain, on this model, replaces both the other sense organs and the hand as key instruments of human practice, as information processing replaces human practice and techne and poesis alike.[9]

In "The Ecstasy of Communication" Baudrillard describes the media as instruments of obscenity, transparency, and ecstasy -- in special sense of these terms.[10] He claims that in the postmodern mediascape, the domestic scene -- or the private sphere per se -- with its rules, rituals, and privacy is exteriorized, or made explicit and transparent, "in a sort of obscenity where the most intimate processes of our life become the virtual feeding ground of the media (the Loud family in the United States, the innumerable slices of peasant or patriarchal life on French television). Inversely, the entire universe comes to unfold arbitrarily on your domestic screen (all the useless information that comes to you from the entire world, like a microscopic pornography of the universe, useless, excessive, just like the sexual close-up in a porno film): all this explodes the scene formerly preserved by the minimal separation of public and private, the scene that was played out in a restricted space" (p. 130).

In addition, the spectacles of the consumer society and the dramas of the public sphere are also being replaced by media events that replace public life and scenes with a screen that shows us everything instantaneously and without scruple or hesitation: "Obscenity begins precisely when there is no more spectacle, no more scene, when all becomes transparence and immediate visibility, when everything is exposed to the harsh and inexorable light of information and communication" (p. 130). The ecstasy of communication: everything is explicit, ecstatic (out of or beyond itself), and obscene in its transparency, detail, and visibility: "It is no longer the traditional obscenity of what is hidden, repressed, forbidden or obscure; on the contrary, it is the obscenity of the visible, of the all-too-visible, of the more-visible-than-visible. It is the obscenity of what no longer has any secret, of what dissolves completely in information and communication" (p. 131). One thinks here of such 1987 media obscenity concerning the trials and tribulations of Gary Hart and Donna Rice, of Jim Bakker and Jimmy Swaggart, of Ron and Nancy Reagans' cancer operations and astrology games, or the dirty business deals of his associates, and the dirty political deals of Iran/Contra -- all of which have been exposed to the glaring scrutiny of the media in which what used to be private, hidden, and invisible suddenly becomes (almost) fully explicit and visible.

In the ecstasy of communication everything becomes transparent, and there are no more secrets, scenes, privacy, depth or hidden meaning. Instead a promiscuity of information and communication unfolds in which the media circulate and disseminate a teeming network of cool, seductive and fascinating sights and sounds to be played on one's own screen and terminal. With the disappearence of exciting scenes (in the home, in the public sphere), passion evaporates in personal and social relations, yet a new fascination emerges ("the scene excites us, the obscene fascinates us") with the very universe of media and communication. In this universe we enter a new form of subjectivity where we become saturated with information, images, events, and ecstasies. Without defense or distance, we become "a pure screen, a switching center for all the networks of influence" (p. 133). In the media society, the era of interiority, subjectivity, meaning, privacy, and the inner life is over; a new era of obscenity, fascination, vertigo, instantaneity, transparency and overexposure begins: Welcome to the postmodern world!

In his more recent 1980 writings which I have not examined here -- and which tend to recycle (i.e. simulate) his earlier positions -- Baudrillard continues to call attention to McLuhan as the great media theorist of our epoch and continues to subscribe to the postions that I explicated above, though occasionally he notes that one should even go further than he has so far in denying that the media are producers of meaning, or that media content or apparatus is important.[11]

Three Subordinations

Undoubtedly, the media are playing an ever greater role in our personal and social lives, and have dramatically transformed our economy, polity, and society in ways that we are only now becoming aware of. Living within a great transformation, perhaps as significant as the transformation from feudalism to industrial capitalism, we are engaged in a process of dramatic mutation, which we are barely beginning to understand, as we enter the brave new world of media saturation, computerization, new technologies, and new discourses. Baudrillard's contribution lies in his calling attention to these novelties and transformations and providing new concepts and theories to understand them.

Yet doubts remain as to whether the media are having quite the impact that Baudrillard ascribes to them and whether his theory provides adequate concepts to analyze the complex interactions between media, culture, and society today. In this section, I shall suggest that Baudrillard's media theory is vitiated by three subordinations which undermine its theoretical and political usefulness and which raise questions as well about the status of postmodern social theory. I shall suggest that the limitations in Baudrillard's theory can be related to his uncritical assumption of certain positions within McLuhan's media theory and that therefore earlier critiques of McLuhan can accurately and usefully be applied to Baudrillard. This critique will suggest that indeed Baudrillard is a "new McLuhan" who has repackaged McLuhan into new postmodern cultural capital.

First, in what might be called a formalist subordination, Baudrillard, like McLuhan, privileges the form of media technology over what might be called the media apparatus, and thus subordinates content, meaning, and the use of media to its purely formal structure and effects. Baudrillard -- much more so than McLuhan who at least gives some media history and analysis of the media environment -- tends to abstract media form and effects from the media environment and thus erases political economy, media production, and media environment (i.e. society as large) from his theory. Against abstracting media form and effects from context, I would argue that the use and effects of media should be carefully examined and evaluated in terms of specific contexts. Distinctions between context and use, form and content, media and reality, all dissolve, however, in Baudrillard's one-dimensional theory where global theses and glib pronouncements replace careful analysis and critique.

Baudrillard might retort that it is the media themselves which abstract from the concreteness of everyday, social, and political life and provide abstract simulacra of actual events which themselves become more real than "the real" which they supposedly represent. Yet even if this is so, media analysis should attempt to recontextualize media images and simulacra rather than merely focusing on the surface of media form. Furthermore, instead of operating with a model of (formal) media effects, I would argue that it is preferable to operate with a dialectical perspective which posits multiple roles and functions to television and other media.

Another problem is that Baudrillard's formalism vitates the project of ideology critique, and against his claims that media content are irrelevant and unimportant, I would propose grasping the dialectic of form and content in media communication, seeing how media forms constitute content and how content is always formed or structured, while forms themselves can be ideological, as when the situation comedy form of conflict/resolution projects an ideological vision which shows all problems easily capable of being resolved within the existing society, or when action-adventure series formats of violent conflict as the essence of reality project a conservative view of human life as a battleground where only the fittest survive and prosper.[12] For a dialectical theory of the media, television would have multiple functions (and potential decodings) where sometimes the ideological effects may be predominant while at other times time functions a medium like television functions as mere noise or through the merely formal effects which Baudrillard puts at the center of his analysis.

Consequently, there is no real theory or practice of cultural interpretation in Baudrillard's media (increasingly anti-)theory, which also emanates an anti-hermeneutical bias that denies the importance of content and is against interpretation.[13] This brings us to a second subordination in Baudrillard's theory in which a more dialectical position is subordinated to media essentialism and technological determinism. For -- according to Baudrillard -- it is the technology of, say, television that determines its effects (one-way transmission, semiurgy, implosion, extermination of meaning and the social) rather than any particular content or message (i.e. for both Baudrillard and McLuhan "the media is the message"), or its construction or use within specific social systems. For Baudrillard, media technology and semiurgy are the demiurges of media practices and effects, separated from their uses by specific economic and political interests, individuals and groups, and the social systems within which they function. Baudrillard thus abstracts media from social systems and essentializes media technology as dominant social forces. Yet against Baudrillard, one could argue that capital continues to be a primary determinant of media form and content in neo-capitalist societies just as state socialism helps determine the form, nature, and effects of technologies in certain state socialist societies.

Baudrillard, like McLuhan, often makes essentializing distinctions between media like television or film, ascribing a particular essence to one, and an opposed essence to the other. Yet it seems highly problematical to reduce apparatuses as complex, contradictory, and many-sided as television (or film or any mass medium) to its formal properties and effects, or to a technological essence. It is therefore preferable, for theories of media in the capitalist societies, to see the media as syntheses of technology and capital, as technologies which serve specific interests and which have specific political and economic effects (rather than merely technological ones). It is also preferable to see the dialectic between media and society in specific historical conjunctures, to see how social content, trends, and imperatives help constitute the media which in turn influence social developments and help constitute social reality.

For Baudrillard, by contrast, the media today simply constitute a simulated, hyperreal, and obscene (in his technical sense) world(view), and a dialectic of media and society is shortcircuited in a new version of technological determinism. The political implications of this analysis are that constituting alternative media, or alternative uses or forms of existing media, is useless or worse because media in their very essence for him militate against emancipatory politics or any project of social transformation. Such cynical views, however, primarily benefit conservative interests who presently control the media in their own interests -- a point to which I shall soon return.

Thirdly, there is a subordination of cultural interpretation and politics in Baudrillard to what might very loosely be called "theory" -- thus constituting a theoricist subordination in Baudrillard. In other words, just as Louis Althusser subordinated concrete empirical and historical analysis to what he called "theoretical practice" -- and thus was criticized for "theoreticism," -- Baudrillard also rarely engages in close analysis or readings of media texts, and instead simply engages in rather abstract theoretical ruminations. Here, his arm-chair or TV screen theorizing might be compared with Foucault's archival theorizing, or to more detailed and systematic media theory and critique, much to, I'm afraid, Baudrillard's detriment.

Baudrillard also rigorously avoids the messy but important terrain of cultural and media politics. There is nothing concerning alternative media practices, for instance, in his theorizing, which he seems to rule out in advance because on his view all media are mere producers of noise, non-communication, the extermination of meaning, implosion, and so on. In "Requiem for the Media," Baudrillard explicitly argues that all mass media communication falls prey to "mass mediatization," that is "the imposition of models": "In fact, the essential Medium is the Model. What is mediatized is not what comes off the daily press, out of the tube, or on the radio: it is what is reinterpreted by the sign form, articulated into models, and administered by the code (just as the commodity is not what is produced industrially, but what is mediatized by the exchange value system of abstraction)" (CPES, pp. 175-176).

All "subversive communication," then, for Baudrillard has to surpass the codes and models of media communication -- and thus of the mass media themselves which invariably translate all contents and messages into their codes. Consequently, not only general elections but general strikes have "become a schematic reducing agent" (CPES, p. 176). In this (original) situation: "The real revolutionary media during May {1968} were the walls and their speech, the silk-screen posters and the hand-painted notices, the street where speech began and was exchanged -everything that was an immediate inscription, given and returned, spoken and answered, mobile in the same space and time, reciprocal and antagonistic. The street is, in this sense, the alternative and subversive form of the mass media, since it isn't, like the latter, an objectified support for answerless messages, a transmission system at a distance. It is the frayed space of the symbolic exchange of speech -- ephemeral, mortal: a speech that is not reflected on the Platonic screen of the media. Institutionalized by reproduction, reduced to a spectacle, this speech is expiring" (CPES, pp. 176-177).

In this text, Baudrillard conflates all previously revolutionary strategies and models of "subversive communication" to "schematic reducing agents" and manifests here once again a nostalgia for direct, unmediated, and reciprocal speech ("symbolic exchange") which is denied in the media society. Haunted by a disappearing metaphysics of presence, Baudrillard valorizes immediate communication over mediated communication thus forgetting that all communication is mediated (through language, through signs, through codes, etc.). Furthermore, he romanticizes a certain form of communication (speech in the streets) as the only genuinely subversive or revolutionary communication and media. Consistently with this theory, he thus calls for a (neo-Luddite) "deconstruction" of the media "as systems of non-communication," and thus for the "liquidation of the existing functional and technical structure of the media" (CPES, p. 177).

Against Baudrillard's utopia of immediate speech -- which he himself abandons in his 1980s writings--, I would defend the project of structural and technical refunctioning of the media as suggested earlier by Brecht, Benjamin, and Enzensberger. Baudrillard, by contrast, not only attacks all form of media communication as non-revolutionary, but eventually, by the late 1970s, he surrenders his commitment to revolutionary theory and drops the notion of revolutionary communication or subversive cultural practices altogether.[14] Moreover, Baudrillard becomes a bit testy and even nasty in his later writing when considering alternative media. In a symptomatic passage in "The Ecstasy of Communication," Baudrillard writes:

the promiscuity {note the moralizing coding here -- D.K.} that reigns over the communication networks is one of superficial saturation, of an incessant solicitation, of an extermination of interstitial and protective spaces. I pick up my telephone receiver and it's all there; the whole marginal network catches and harasses me with the insupportable good faith of everything that wants and claims to communicate. Free radio: it speaks, it sings, it expresses itself. Very well, it is the sympathetic obscenity of its content. In terms a little different for each medium, this is the result: a space, that of the FM band, is found to be saturated,... Speech is free perhaps, but I am less free than before: I no longer succeed in knowing what I want, the space is so saturated, the pressure so great from all who want to make themselves heard.

I fall into the negative ecstasy of the radio (pp. 131-132).
Against this snide and glib put-down of alternative media, I would argue that alternative television-radio-film provide the possibility of another type of media with different forms, content, goals, and effects from mainstream media.[15] A radical media project would thus attempt to transform both the form and the content of the media, as well as their organization and social functions. In a socialist society, mass media would be part of a communal public sphere and alternative media would be made accessible to all groups and individuals who wished to participate in media communication. This would presuppose dramatic expansion of media access and thus of media systems which would require more channels, technology, and a social commitment to democratic communication.
To preserve its autonomy, such systems should be state funded but not controlled -- much like television in several European countries.[16] It would also have to function as the better local public access systems now do in the United States in which a certain number of channels are put aside for public use and available to everyone on a non-discriminatory basis. In Austin, Texas, for instance, we now have a multi-channel access system with two channels reserved for city government, one city educational channel for use by the Austin school system, one for regularly scheduled weekly access shows by groups committed to public access television, and two channels open to anyone for any use whatsover (these two channels are currently dominated by religious, musical, and sports programming). So far this system has proved functional, allowing just about any individual or group the opportunity to make and broadcast their own programming and statements.

An alternative media system would thus provide the possibility for oppositional, counterhegemonic subcultures and groups to produce programs expressing their own views, oppositions, and struggles that resist the massification, homogenization, and passivity that Baudrillard and others attribute to the media. Alternative media allow marginal and oppositional voices to contest the view of the world, values, and life-styles of the mainstream, and make possible the circulation and growth of alternative subcultures and communities. Baudrillard's theoreticism, however, completely eschews cultural practice and becomes more and more divorced from the political struggles and issues of the day -- though the question of Baudrillard's politics would take another long and very tortured paper to deal with. Reflecting briefly on Baudrillard's media theory leads me to three provisional conclusions:

1) Postmodern media theory is rather impoverished qua media theory and reproduces the limitations of McLuhan's media theory: formalism, technological determinism, and essentialism. John Fekete's critique of McLuhan might profitably be applied to Baudrillard, as might some of the other criticisms of McLuhan once in fashion which may need to be recycled a second time for the new McLuhan(cy).[17] The theory of autonomous media also return with Baudrillard; thus the critiques of autonomous technology can usefully and relevantly be applied to Baudrillard, and, more generally to postmodern social theory.[18]

2) The very weakness of postmodern media theory raises fundamental questions about the status of postmodern social theory itself. The question arises as to whether an implosive theory -like Baudrillard's -- that denies all the boundaries of previous social theory is in a position to carefully and rigorously work out the complex relations and contradictions between the media, economy, state, culture and society, or whether -- as I believe -- neo-Marxian theories of dialectics and mediations are preferable.

3) So I conclude that more sustained critical focus on Baudrillard's theory of the media (as well as all of his other theories) is necessary -- as opposed to the celebatory adultation which has so far -- at least in some circles -surrounded the emergence of a New Master Discourse. If the Baudrillardian postmodern theory is inadequate, then we need new theories to illuminate the multi-faceted and significant roles of the media in contemporary capitalist societies. No such theory exists -- which is part of the attraction of Baudrillard who at least tries to offer a new media theory adequate to its object -and the production of one is perhaps Baudrillard's real challenge to us.

Notes

1. This polemic draws on material from my forthcoming book _Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond_ (Polity Press, 1989). I am grateful to Arthur Kroker for penetrating critical remarks on an earlier version of this text, to Steve Best for incisive critiques of several versions of the text, and to Peter Bruck who proposed expansion of the political implications of my critique. In this paper, I shall use the following abbreviations in the text for Baudrillard's work: CPES=_Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign_ (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1978); SSM=_In the Shadows of the Silent Majorities_ (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983); SIM= _Simulations_ (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983); and SED=_De la seduction_ (Paris: Galilee, 1979).

2. Baudrillard presents a rather extreme variant of a negative model of the media which sees mass media and culture simply as instruments of domination, manipulation, and social control in which radical intervention and radical media or cultural politics are impossible. Baudrillard thus shares a certain theoretical terrain on theories of the media with the Frankfurt school, many Althusserians and other French radicals, and those who see electronic media, broadcasting, and mass culture simply as a terrain of domination. For my critique of the Frankfurt school media theory, see _Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).

3. Baudrillard, Review of _Understanding Media_ in _L'Homme et la Societe_, Nr. 5 (1967), pp. 227ff.

4. See Jurgen Habermas, _Theory and Practice_ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), and the critique in Rick Roderick, _Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory_ (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).

5. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, "Constituents of a Theory of the Media," in _The Consciousness Industry_ _New York: Seabury_, 1974.

6. See Marshall McLuhan, _Understanding Media_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984). Scott Lash proposes use of the term "de-differentiation" in "Discourse or Figure? Postmodernism as a 'Regime of Signification,'" _Theory, Culture & Society_, Vol. 5, Nrs. 2-3 (June 1988).

7. Douglas Kellner, "Boundaries and Borderlines: Reflections on Baudrillard and Critical Theory," _Current Perspectives in Social Theory_ (forthcoming 1988).

8. On McLuhan's catholicism, see John Fekete, "McLuhancy: Counterrevolution in Cultural Theory" (Telos 15, Spring 1973), pp. 75 123 and Arthur Kroker, _Technology and the Canadian Mind_ (Montreal: New World Press, 1984).

9. Fekete, ibid, pp. 100ff.

10. Jean Baudrillard, "The Ecstasy of Communication," in Hal Foster, editor, _The Anti-Aesthetic_ (Port Washington, N.Y.: 1983). Page references from this source will be inserted in the text.

11. Kellner, _Jean Baudrillard_, Ibid.

12. For further elaboration, see Douglas Kellner, "TV, Ideology and Emancipatory Popular Culture," _Socialist Review_ 42 (Nov-Dec 1979), pp. 13-53 and "Television Images, Codes, and Messages," _Televisions_, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1980), pp. 2-19.

13. See Steven Best and Douglas Kellner "(Re)Watching Television: Notes Toward a Political Criticism," _Diacritics_ (Summer 1987), pp. 97-113 for elaboration of the project of developing a political hermeneutics against postmodernist (mostly formalist and anti-hermeneutical) modes of criticism.

14. Kellner, _Jean Baudrillard_, Ibid.

15. This argument is elaborated in Douglas Kellner, "Public Access Television: _Alternative Views_," _Radical Science Journal_ 16, _Making Waves_ (1985), pp. 79-92, and Steve Best and Douglas Kellner, "Watching Television: The Limitations of Post-Modernism," _Science as Culture_ 4 (forthcoming 1988). I point to some of the limitations in Baudrillard's media theory for analysis of contemporary politics in "Baudrillard, Semiurgy and Death" _Theory, Culture & Society_, Vol. IV (1987), pp. 125-146.

16. I shall develop this position in my forthcoming book _Television, Politics and Society: Towards a Critical Theory of Television_ (forthcoming Westview Press).

17. Fekete, Ibid.

18. See Langdon Winner, _Autonomous Technology_ (Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 1977).

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