Showing posts with label creativity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label creativity. Show all posts

Thursday, May 27, 2010

DISTRIBUTED CREATIVITY MODELS: THE CROWD-SOURCING, Giulia Baldi



It was maybe predictable and it is definitely significant: Creative Review's has included crowd-sourcing among the topics covered in their 'Year in Review' December issue.


I haven't checked the magazine yet, but I am researching on digital creative crowd-sourcing models since a while and I think they represent such an interesting opportunity for creatives that we should celebrate here.


Known in academic terms as a "distributed problem-solving and content-production model", and in marketing ones as "the outsourcing of functions normally performed by a supplier or contractor to a crowd of people or a community", crowd-sourcing is a neologism first used by Jeff Howe, editor of Wired US, in an article that dates back to 2006. There, he describes the shift that creatives (mostly copywriters, designers, photographers, illustrators, animators, videomakers, directors... or wannabe so) are taking in the networked society.


With the development of web technologies and communities, in fact, the global creative workforce is finally connected, and can finally be active online. Thus, it can decide to move from being represented by offline exclusive and expensive agencies to online accessible and inexpensive platforms


It has all started with websites like Istockphotos.com, a marketplace developed for non-professional photographers that allows anyone to upload his/her own works and to sell them directly to clients, at a fraction of the usual costs. This way, talented emerging artists are now competing with the privileged establishment, and cutting all middlemen and their top rewards. As content producers, they are earning more and they are allowing their clients to spend less than before (for products which are as good as the average professional ones).


So far, so good. These new adventures are just confirming the crowd-sourcing principle that a creative collective can produce better (and cheaper) results than an individual, and making it real. As many other times in the past, technology is slowly but steadily disrupting the status quo of an old industry and creating a new one. But then, even more disruptive stories follows.


With 99desing (AU), BootB (IT), CrowdSpring (US), IdeaBounty (SA/UK), RadarMusic (UK) and Zooppa (IT/US/BR), a new crowd-sourcing model for creativity has emerged. On one side, these new online marketplaces/communities engage with brands offering them the chance to launch contests on specific briefs and get bespoke creative proposals... for smaller fees than those of the traditional agencies. On the other, they engage deeper with professional and non-professional creatives allowing them to participate to real global competitions, based on real brands' briefs... and to participate easily and remotely, i.e. wherever they live and whatever else they are doing, without any agency to represent, and exploit, them.


Furthermore, some of these platforms even delegate to the community the selection of the best entries. Because, again, in the web 2.0 ethos, we are better than me.


Everyone happy? Not yet. There is a problem, in fact... Maybe even two or three.


1) With these platforms, all participants need to do their bit as speculative job and have very limited chance to win. In the offline advertisement industry the pitch-to-brief system has always been the custom; online this process has reached another level: in the average, there are loads of contestants for every project and just little reward for the winning ones. So much so that a proper professional movement called 'no-spec job' has recently made a lot of noise against this practice, based on the assumption that open and cheap competitions are unprofessional and unfair. At the same time, the brands, platforms and users that instead have embraced this model, reclaim the freedom of choice: once that the process is clearly presented, everyone should be free of participating, considering pros and cons from a personal perspective. And in fact, while some have probably kept doing things the old way (they maybe live in big metropolis and have loads of useful contacts), thousands are instead sending now their ideas and projects through these platforms, and hundreds are gaining valuable visibility and good money (that would have not obtained otherwise).


2) the average quality of the outputs isn't that bad, but isn't even that good;


3) brands can rarely build a meaningful relationship with creatives and long lasting strategies virtually;


4) when the selection is not up to the community, it can be definitely too time-consuming for anyone in the industry...


All in all, maybe a new breed of online platforms/agencies is needed, one that will maintain traditional agency project management and campaigns creative curatorship while introducing new remote collaborative practices. And, in fact, a revised model, based on both top down and bottom up principles, has recently been adopted by one of the 'old' platfroms, GeniusRocket (US), and more will probably follow.


In their words, 'We have always understood that crowdsourcing is a process of evolution. From that, we believe that there is still plenty of room to improve upon creative crowd-sourcing. We plan to address the three biggest requests of the creative community; higher awards, more feedback, and less risk, while addressing the request of the client; more polished, selected, creative content.'


How are they planning to achieve it? ' Launching GRSelect. 'The three most important differences between GRSelect and other crowdsourcing sites (including GeniusRocket.com) is that artists will be required to apply in order to participate in each project. First, applicants will be vetted based upon their past work and their submitted proposal. Second, GRSelect projects will work across iterative rounds allowing the artists to receive feedback directly from the client prior to production or final submission. Finally, while not everyone will be accepted to participate in a project, everyone that does make into a project will earn awards based upon their efforts.'


Now, this sounds really good. And this is even becoming a trend: in the last few weeks, a new platform based on the same mixed approach has been launched, and it is called... Victors and Spoils (US). While another one will be launched soon, with the name Guided By Voices (UK).


Creatives out there, no more excuses! Now you can submit your portfolios, be selected, participate to contests, and win your 15 mins of glory and even some pocket money (that now can reach peaks of 10K$), without risking to waste too much of your time. And, yes... Next year you could be on Creative Review.

above copied from: http://www.digicult.it/digimag/article.asp?id=1678

Tuesday, March 9, 2010

Imagination beyond Representation, Bonjana Piskur



Everything in the world began with a yes. One molecule said yes to another molecule and life was born. How does one start at the beginning, if things happen before they actually happen? (Clarice Lispector)

For some time now we have been considering the questions about the political potential of a work of art, or, put somewhat differently, about freeing the revolutionary potential of art from its social and political forms of representation and from the limitations of its communicative medium. Jacques Ranciere, for example, talks about emancipation of art from its representative regime.

But what does this actually mean? When we consider the political potential of an artwork, we are usually attentive to the possible changes in the social field that this work can stimulate or evoke. We think about the devices in an artwork (such as the motives, the narratives, or “meaningful spectacle” as Ranciere put it) that contribute towards raising the political awareness in a social and economic order. We can even say that it is all about certain political pedagogy. But what we are actually talking about are the ways politics condition art and not about art’s emancipation from the representational regime.

What we are interested in, then, is something else: the unmediated experiences, acts of creation, operations of desire or even insights, which are not yet formalized knowledge but thoughts in their purest formation, passing the field which has been liberated from the institutionalized rationality. Translations of these operations into the so called representative regime of art are never unproblematic, since they stimulate anxiety, incite new reactions and interruptions of the already-known and if not, they remain hidden until they reach their “extractive conditions”. But how does one recognize the moment of moving beyond the subjective territory of the “not yet” into the plane of transversal linkage? How can radical imagination contribute towards crossing that threshold in question, bridging the gap between subjectivity and the representative regime of art?

In order to attempt to answer these questions we should not only reconsider the meaning of imagination and creativity but also the long tradition of conformity to forms of expression and content which resulted in representation dominating our way of thinking. It has been suggested (Simon O’Sullivan) that under different circumstances the art history practice as it is known now might disappear, that is, the kind of practice which positions an artwork as a representation, as a hermeneutic activity.
Imagination is traditionally understood as one’s ability to form mental images, concepts and sensations, which subsequently become defined by images they create of themselves. Images created by imagination are then overwhelmed by a “schema”, a classificatory system that hierarchically organizes knowledge about the world. This is the representation Deleuze called “organic representation” and it is opposite to the “rhizome”. For Deleuze and Guattari thinking non-representational involved thinking difference in itself. And this difference necessarily involves movement and desire; desire in a sense of being a mode of production and constructing of something (for example: a will to live, to create, to love, to invent another society, another value system).

David Bohm, a physicist and theorist, has written about creative and constructive imagination: the former involves perception before a mental vision, a certain insight, and only in the unfolding of this insight in the form of an image is the mind ready to pass the content of the insight into the domain of constructive imagination. Constructive imagination involves reasoning and taking images from memory and from other contexts, as well as already available structures and concepts that come from memory; for scientists it is a hypothesis, for artists the finalization of the perceptive process into an artwork and for writers a translation of thoughts into language. But as Bohm suggests, the creative and constructive are never completely separated, therefore the relationship between imagination and reason must also be taken into account.

Niklas Luhmann attributed to art the function of integrating perception into the communication network of a society. According to him, art only exists within the art system; it is a self-referential system, which interacts with other systems. Once this system recognizes art, the difference between inside and outside cannot disappear again. Luhmann also suggests that if perception and conceptual thought are constructed by the brain, then art should reject the functional concepts of representation, that is, forms that demonstrate the possibility of order and the impossibility of arbitrariness. He notes that only in the form of intuition (or in other words, artistic sensibility) does art acquire the possibility of constructing imaginary worlds within the life-world.

This is where he comes close to DG’s concept of desire and Bohm’s idea of insight. Moreover, what these authors suggest is that these concepts alone are not enough and that some kind of relationship between imagination and reason must be involved (Bohm), intuition and life-world or perception and communicating social system (Luhmann) and desire and stratum (Deleuze) in order to fully realize their revolutionary potential before they get captured by the molar machine or by the state philosophy which is another name for representational thinking. In other words, there needs to be some kind of “situated imagining” in order to point somewhere, there need to be some kind of strata available in order not to fall into the black pit.

It has been said that to invoke imagination as supporting radical politics has become a cliché. But isn’t this kind of statement grounded in another domain of representational thinking as well? And isn’t it our concern, after all, to change the way we make meanings and not just to change the meanings themselves? Or is writing about it already producing another representation?

One way to change the way we make meanings would be to simply do nothing, to avoid the so called “creative imperative” that has been so thoroughly imposed on us by capitalism. I am sure that many of you know the short text by the artist Mladen Stilinović called “In praise of laziness”. In it he talks about the importance of an artist being lazy. What is especially significant in this short text is his noting that laziness is not only the absence of thought, staring at nothing, non-activity, impotence … but that it is really what art is all about, and not some preoccupation with objects and other such matters. In his Fifteen theses on contemporary art Badiou writes that it is better to do nothing than to contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that which Empire already recognizes as existent. Žižek has proposed that one alternative way to oppose the dominant system could be to withdraw from all forms of political representation, to renounce social and political responsibility, resist the compulsion to act, and instead do nothing. Of course, the question is, how can such non-activity, such doing nothing be revolutionary - resistant in any way? It can be easily considered an escape, a utopia without any meaning. But doing nothing is also becoming different, creating conditions for encounters that are not based on some kind of concept of identity, but on something previously unthought. When perception is liberated of mental images it does not only oppose object relations (schemes of power etc) but radically cancels them.
To give an example: surrealists were concerned with the emancipation of thought, and recognized imagination as a powerful weapon using techniques such as automatic writing, drawing, trance narrations … to move away from the conventional significations. But on the other hand, this kind of private fantasy or reverie could not affect or disrupt the social fabric, as they believed it would; it remained on the level of imaginary projections. Similarly, David Bohm invented a “flow language” – Rheomode, based on motion, because, as he said, reality leads to fragmentation of thought and to unending reductionism, therefore thought needs a constant flow to override this confusion.

And yet: could there be other possibilities? Perhaps we should think spatio-temporal planes differently, access that which is normally outside ourselves, to make ourselves a body without organs, as Artaud wrote in 1947:

When you will have made him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom.
If art is something that we consider an activity as such, it could be that art’s rupture is the event, or, in the words of Lyotard: “To encounter the event is like bordering on nothingness.” What he suggests is that in order to take on the attitude of an event, one needs to clean out his/her mind, reject modes of preestablished encodings and subsequently the fixity of representation. But the problem is that such affects (or intensities) have no vocabulary and are therefore wedded to theories: as Massumi points out, intensities then lose this kind of eventness in favor of a structure.

Examples of these intensities are “moments”, eruptions of spontaneous creativity, flashes of liberation, utopian consciousness that escape the daily programming. Moments are transitory, critical, creative, unpredictable … and they produce fractures in our subjectivity, introduce a sense of freedom from categorical thought, discipline, common structures, restraints and the like, since they have not yet become alienated time. Moments are sensations of powerful emotions such as delight, disgust, surprise, horror, outrage, and intense euphoria, and as such have a revolutionary potential.

But again: is the revolutionary potential hidden in the prolongation and intensification of such moments, or in their reactivation in the process of defixating meanings?

The analogy can be drawn here with Ranciere’s suggestions that “the dream of an art is to transmit meanings in the form of a rupture with the very logic of meaningful situations”. Native Americans, for example, believe that what appears as a material object or image in space is simply the manifestation of a unique combination of energy waves. Occasionally temporary markings appear in the flux, which are then used as reference points. And these points are what constitute reality.

It would be naïve to suppose that only by breaking or ridding the strata (representation), would one be able to set free. After all, if you lose images you lose space. As DG said: staying organized, signified, subjected is not the worst thing that can happen. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight; through connections of desires, con­junctions of flows, a continuum of intensities.

Or, put differently: blowing up the molar machine will get one destroyed – and not the machine itself. Instead of symmetrical opposition to repressive representation, instead of opposing the current reality in an alleged parallel reality “the aim is now the principle that leads the destiny of creation”. Therefore the political potential of art is in unleashing mind’s most creative capacities, moving away from representation into experience, becoming the “power of emergence” into the open field of unknown relations, which traverse all domains of being into unlimited number of connections in every sense and in all directions, of infinite spreading into schools, prisons, factories, art museums and further on towards where “communication is occurring at the edge of impossible crossings, or perhaps in the gap of potential contact.”

Above copied from: http://radical.temp.si/2009/12/imagination-beyond-representation-by-bojana-piskur/

Sunday, November 30, 2008

Collaboration - 7 notes on new ways of learning and working together, Florian Schneider



If one principle could be seen to inform the opaque surface of what in the 1990s was called a "new economy" -- the shifts and changes, the dynamics and blockades, the emergencies and habit formations taking place within the realm of immaterial production -- it would certainly be: "Work together".

Facing the challenges of digital technologies, global communications, and networking environments, as well as the inherant ignorance of traditional systems towards these, 'working together' has emerged as an unsystematic mode of collective learning processes.

Slowly and almost unnoticeably, a new word came into vogue. At first sight it might seem the least significant common denominator for describing new modes of working together, yet "collaboration" has become one of the leading terms of an emergent contemporary political sensibility.

Often collapsed into the most utilitarian understanding, 'collaboration' is far more than acting together, as it extends towards a network of interconnected approaches and efforts. Literally meaning working together with others, especially in an intellectual endeavor, the term is nowadays widely used to describe new forms of labour relations within the realm of immaterial production in various fields; yet despite its significant presence there is very little research and theoretical reflection on it. This might be due to a wide range of partly contradictory factors that are interestingly intertwined.

As a pejorative term, collaboration stands for willingly assisting an enemy of one's country, especially an occupying force or malevolent power. It means working together with an agency with which one is not immediately connected. Most prominently, "collaboration" became the slogan of the French Vichy regime after the meeting of Hitler and Marshall Petain in Lontoire-sur-le-Loir in October 1940. In a radio speech Petain officially enlisted the French population to "collaborate" with the German occupiers, while the French resistance movement later branded those who cooperated with the German forces as "collaborators".

Despite these negative origins, the term collaboration is mostly used today as a synonym for cooperation. Dictionary definitions and vernacular uses are generally more or less equivalent; but etymologically, historically and politically it seems to make more sense to elaborate on the actual differences between various coexisting layers of meaning.

Is it in principle, possible to make a relevant distinction between cooperation and collaboration and to what end? If so, what characterizes the constellations, social assemblages and relationships in which people collaborate? And last but not least: Does this have any impact for the current debate on education?

What follows are seven notes and propositions in which I try do adress these questions in a very preliminary, eclectic and sketchy way.

1.

In pedagogical discourse, both cooperation and collaboration are relatively new terms. They emerged in the 1970s in the context of "joint learning activities" and "project-based learning", which were supposed to break with an authoritarian teacher-centred style of guiding the thinking of the student.

What might be defined as "educational teamwork" corresponds to an idea promoted at the same time by management theory; that is, in a teamwork environment, people are supposed to understand and believe that thinking, planning, decisions and actions are better when done in cooperation.

At the beginning of the last century and well ahead of his time, Andrew Carnegie, steel-tycoon and founder of Carnegie Technical Schools, said: "Teamwork is the ability to work together toward a common vision, the ability to direct individual accomplishments toward organizational objectives. It is the fuel that allows common people to attain uncommon results."

To this day, this famous quote has probably featured prominently in a myriad powerpoint presentations by human resource managers across the globe, but its central argument only became a reality in the early 1980s, when the crisis in the car manufacturing industries triggered the first large scale proliferation of the concept of teamwork in the realm of industrial production.

Factories that had hitherto been characterized by a highly specialized division of labour usually coupled with a strong self-organization of the workers in labour unions were turned upside down: teamwork started being considered as a prerequisite for breaking the power of the unions, dropping labour costs and moving towards so-called 'lean' production, which was seen at the time as a response to global competition and the success of Japanese exports to the US and Europe in particular.

In late industrial capitalism the notion of teamwork represented the subjugation of workers' subjectivity to an omnipresent and individualized control regime. The concept of group replaced the classical one of "foremanship" as the disciplining force. Rather than through repression, cost efficiency was increased by means of peer-pressure and the collective identification of relatively small groups of multi-skilled co-workers.

The model of teamwork soon spread across different industries and branches, yet without any great success. Meanwhile, various research studies showed that teams often make the wrong decisions, especially when the task involves solving rather complex problems. Teamwork frequently fails for the simple fact that internalized modes of cooperation are characterized by "hoarding" or stockpiling, quite the opposite of knowledge sharing: in the pursuit of a career, relevant information must be hidden from others. Joining forces in a group or team also increases the likelihood of failure rather than success; awkward group dynamics, unforeseeable external pressures and bad management practices are responsible for the rest.

This overall failure is even more staggering if we consider that rapid technological development and the availability of global intellectual resources were supposed to have increased the pressure on individuals to exchange knowledge within and between groups. Yet as knowledge became the main productive force, neither the free wheeling and well-meaning strategies of anti-authoritarianism nor the brutal force of coercing cooperation seemed capable of establishing any new dimensions of the dynamics of 'working together'.

2.

Increasing evidence shows that 'working together' actually occurs in rather unpredictable and unexpected ways. Rather than through the exertion of the alleged generosity of a group made up of individuals in the pursuit of solidarity, it often works as a brusque and even ungenerous practice, where individuals rely on one another the more they chase their own interests, their mutual dependence arising through the pursuit of their own agendas. Exchange then becomes an effect of necessity rather than one of mutuality, identification or desire.

This entails an initial level of differentiation between cooperation and collaboration: in contrast to cooperation, collaboration is driven by complex realities rather than romantic notions of common grounds or commonality. It is an ambivalent process constituted by a set of paradoxical relationships between co-producers who affect one another.

In "Le Maître ignorant", published in 1983, Jacques Rancière indicates that ignorance is the first virtue of the master or teacher. He gives the example of Joseph Jacotot, an exiled French revolutionary, professor of French literature at the University of Louvain in Belgium from 1815. Jacotot taught French to his Dutch-speaking students in the absence of a shared language, through what appears to be an entirely collaborative method: without setting up a common agenda, identifying a common ground or communicating through a shared set of tools, he "placed himself in his students' hands and told them, through an interpreter, to read half of the book with the aid of the translation, to repeat constantly what they had learned, to quickly read the other half and then to write in French what they thought about it." This "teaching without transmitting knowledge", as Rancière defines it, seemed to be incredibly successful, because it granted a level of autonomy to the students who acquired their own knowledge as they deemed useful and independently from their teacher.

Rancière's example is particularly enlightening in the context of collaboration and its relation to notions of hierarchy which so much of collaborative disoiurse deems to have vanquished. It exposes the hypocrisy of the supposed anti-authoritarianism that essentially underlies many notions of cooperation. This misconception might be seen as the practice of liberally weakening the position of power, yet ignoring the inherent paradox of doing so, so that in an infinite line of regression power reappears even stronger than before. The more it tries to explain, mediate, communicate or teach, the more it reaffirms the distance, inequality and dependency of those who lack knowledge on those who seem to possess it. The same applies to cooperation and teamwork: a presumption of equality actually extends both discrimination and exploitation while seemingly providing continuous evidence in support of such an illusion, as if there were no radically different modes of working together.

3.

The work of Jacotot's students can be seen as a form of collaboration with their teacher that flattens the hierarchies and does away with the teacher-student relationship altogether, without romanticising it. Through collaboration hierarchies are neither criticised nor morally disapproved of and hypocritically discarded. This way of working together is capable of ignoring the ignorance of the ignorant and of pauperizing the poverty of the pauper precisely because collaborators are neither questioning obvious authority nor pretending to be equal. Instead they have worked out a system not of exchange but of flow in which these positions are avoided altogether.

Collaborations are the black holes of knowledge regimes. They willingly produce nothingness, opulence and ill-behaviour. And it is their very vacuity which is their strength. Unlike cooperation, collaboration does not take place for sentimental reasons, for philanthropical impulses or for the sake of efficiency; it arises out of pure self interest. Collaborations could reveal the amazing potential whereby an ignorant, poor or otherwise property-less person can enable another ignorant, poor or otherwise property-less person to know what he or she did not know and to access what he or she did not access. It does not entail the transmission of something from those who have to those who do not , but rather the setting in motion of a chain of unforseen accesses.

Shifting the focus away from its components and outcomes, collaboration is a performative and transformative process: the sudden need to cross the familiar boundaries of one's own experiences, skills and intellectual resources to enter nameless and foreign territories where abilities that had been considered "individual" marvellously merge with those of others. In this sequence, outcomes and processes follow an inverse relation as do the relations of power. For what comes about is not the 'granting' of access but a recognition across the board of those involved in the process, that it is the unexpected multiplicity and uncertain location of the points of access that is at stake in the exchange.

4.

Translating the concept of collaboration back to the context of education also points to a reverse-engineering of the teacher's role. Etymologically, in Greek and Latin "pedagogue" or "educator" means "drawing out" or "pulling out" and refers to an ancient Greek practice: a family slave called "pedagogue" used to walk the child from the private house to a place of learning. Rather than the teacher, who was supposed to have and transmit knowledge, the pedagogue was the person who accompanied the student to the place where the teacher imparted it.

This rather spatial notion of bringing somebody across a specific border evokes striking associations with human trafficking. The escape agent or "coyote" - as it is named at the US-Mexican border - supports undocumented border crossers who want to make it from one nation state to another without the demanded paperwork. Permanently on the move, only temporarily employed, nameless, anonymous and constantly changing faces and sides, the coyote is, in an ironic way, the perfect role-model for both education and collaboration. As a metaphor it serves the purpose of destabalising the idea of 'knowledge in movement' away from its always assumed progressive direction. Instead it allows for a certain degree of illegitimacy inherent in all forms of collaboration and distinguishes it from the always perfectly sanctioned and legitimate nature of cooperation. By extracting a principle of mobility and perceiving the lack of legitimacy as enabling as opposed to criminally inhuman and disabling, the 'coyote' who may or may not be motivated by self gain without ideological committment, produces a possibility whose parameters cannot be gaged.

The "coyote's" motivations remain unclear or, shall we say, do not matter at all. The "coyote" is the postmodern service provider par excellence. The fact that there is no trust whatsoever between those engaging in the transcation, does not actually play any part in the unfolding of its play. Here , we might say, conceptual insecurity overrides the financial aspects of the collaboration and triggers a redundancy of affects and perceptions, feelings and reactions. Those who do not need the coyote's support hunt and demonize it; those who rely on the coyote's secret knowledge and skills appreciate it all the more. The extreme polarities of these responses instantiate the range of the collaborative field and the impossibility of navigating it through moralising vectors.

Ultimately, collaboration with a coyote generates pure potential: ranging from the dream of a better life to the reality of pure living labour power ready to be over-exploited in the informal labour market. If it wasn't for its totally deregulated character, this practice would bear similar results to that of traditional educational systems; we might say that in this exchange nothing can be claimed for material existence, let alone possession, but neverthelss something very precious and entirely precarious comes into being; pure imagination, yet potentially powerful beyond measure.

5.

Against the background of postmodern control society, collaboration is about secretly exchanging knowledge independently of borders. It stands for the attempt to regain autonomy and get hold of immaterial resources in a knowledge-driven economy. It no longer matters who has knowledge and who owns the resources; what matters is access: not a generously granted accessibility but a direct, immediate and instant access, often gained illegally or illegitimately.

While cooperation involves identifiable individuals within and between organizations, collaboration expresses a differentiated relationship made up of heterogeneous elements that are defined as singularities. As such they are not identifiable or subject to easy categories of identity, but defined out of an emergent relation between themselves. As such collaboration is extra-ordinary in so far as it produces a discontinuity and marks a point of unpredictability, however deterministic. Its unpredicatbility takes the form of not being able to entirely categorise the components of the collaborative process, even when its general aim or drive may be steering it in a particular direction.

Rationality has here been replaced by a kind of relationality that constantly decomposes and recomposes information in order to make temporary use of unexpected dynamics and contingencies: from stock market speculation to the development of network protocols, from the production of new forms of aesthetics in art and culture to a generation of political activism with global aspirations.

People meet and work together under circumstances where their efficiency, performance and labour power cannot be singled out and individually measured; everyone's work points to someone else's. Making and maintaining connections seems more important than trying to capture and store ideas. One's own production is very peculiar yet it is generated and often multiplied in networks composed of countless distinct dependencies and constituted by the power to affect and be affected. At no point in the process can this be arrested and ascertained, for it gains its power by not having explicit points of entry or exit as a normative work scenario might.

This excess is essentially beyond measure; collaboration relates to the mathematical definition of singularity as the point where a function goes to infinity or is somehow ill-behaved. The concept of singularity distinguishes collaboration from cooperation and refers to an emerging notion of precariousness, a systemic instability. this in turn can be seen as the crisis associated with the shift and transition from cooperation to collaboration in modes of working together.

The nets of voluntariness, enthusiasm, creativity, immense pressure, ever increasing self-doubt and desperation are temporary and fluid; they take on multiple forms but always refer to a permanent state of insecurity and precariousness, the blue print for widespread forms of occupation and employment within society. They reveal the other side of immaterial labour, hidden in the rhetoric of 'working together'.

6.

Today it is tremendously urgent to learn how to deal with such excess. This is not simply the realm of an exclusive minority of geeks, nerds, drop-outs and neurotic freelancers; it invests a rapidly growing global immaterial labour force that is confronted with the prospect of life-long learning witout the complimentary prospect of there ever having a teacher or a schoolbook in store, because knowledge emerges as useless as soon as it can be commodified and reproduced as such.

The crucial question is how a form of education to collaboration is possible that is not reduced ad absurdum to become the application of truism after truism. Certainly this would not mean the staging of a collaborative process within the classroom or other spaces of learning. This debate can take place at a meta-level or around the issue of "un-organizing" oneself in order to be aware and ready for the future challenges of collaborative working environments. It can takle place in the fragementation of the components of bodies of knowledge and their re-alignemnt with one another according to other principles. Or it can take place in the removing of pre-determined directions around the flows of knowledge.

Cooperation necessarily takes place in client-server architectures. It follows a metaphorical narrative structure, where the coherent assignment of each part and its relation to the others gets reproduced over and over again. The current educational system mirrors this structure and is therefore essentially incapable of responding to contemporary challenges, let alone future ones. Even worse, the more the system attempts to re-modernize itself, the more it sinks in the swamp of commodification, homogenization and hierarchization. Obviously the problem lies with the educational system's understanding of what contemporary imperatives are and its insistance that these must have an 'applicable' function. If a model of collaboration were to be applied to educational cultures , then it would have to accept an inabilty to predetermine outcomes even while sharing a set of aspirations or directives or being anchored in a set of recognised probelamtics.

7.

Collaboration entails rhizomatic structures where knowledge grows exuberantly and proliferates in unforeseeable ways. In contrast to cooperation, which always implies an organic model and a transcendent function, collaboration is a strictly immanent and wild praxis. Every collaborative activity begins and ends within the framework of the collaboration. It has no external goal and cannot be decreed; it is strict intransitivity, it takes place, so to speak, for its own sake.

Collaborations are voracious. Once they are set into motion they can rapidly beset and affect entire modes of production. "Free" or "open source" software development is probably the most prominent example for the transformative power of collaboration to "un-define" the relationships between authors and producers on one side and users and consumers on the other side. It imposes a paradigm that treats every user as a potential collaborator who could effectively join the development of the code regardless of their actual interests and capacities. Participation becomes virtual: It is enough that one could contribute a patch or file an issue, one does not necessarily have to do it in order to enjoy the dynamics, the efficacy and the essential openess of a collaboration.

In the last instance, the democratic or egalitarian ambition has migrated into the realm of virtuality: Open source developer groups usually do not follow the patterns and rules of representative democracy, the radical notion of equality reveals in the general condition that everyone has instant and unrestricted access to the entire set of resources that form a development. The result is as simple as it is convincing: Those who disagree may "fork" and start their own development branch without loosing access to the means of production.

On the internet, distributed non-hierarchical information architectures are characterized as "peer-to-peer" (P2P) networks. They emerged in the 1990s and triggered a revolution of the conventional distribution model. These networks were first designed to exchange immaterial resources such as computing time or bandwidth, mainly in scientific academic contexts. Their aim was to overcome technological limits, incapacities and shortages by combining the existing free resources.

Since the late 1990s the same network architecture has been used to exchange relevant content: music and movies were distributed amongst ordinary personal computers that worked as both downstream and upstream nodes in mushrooming networks.

The enormous success of these projects, from "Napster" to "BitTorrent" - currently estimated to account for nearly half of the total of internet traffic - enabled people who do not know each other and probably prefer to not know each other to actually "share" their hard drives. In fact, their anonymous relationships are based on the irony of sharing, even in a strictly mathematical sense: due to lossless and cost free digital copying the object of desire is indeed multiplied rather than divided.

In the last instance collaborations are driven by the desire to create difference and refuse the absolutistic power of organization. Collaboration entails overcoming scarcity and inequality and struggling for the freedom to produce. It carries an immense social potential, as it is a form of realisation and experience of the unlimited creativity of a multiplicity of all productive practices.

The possibility of relating these notions of collaboration to contemporary education and pedagogy, have less to do with emulating their operating modes and more to do with their ability to inspire a realignment of the relations in the field. Not limited to the seeming good intentions and democratising impulses of the 'working together' dimension of collaboration,in education this might mean rethinking both the direction and flow of its activities. For example the shifting of the focus of attention away from the exclusive direction of instructor to instructed, or shifting the directions of the exchanges that take place towards a circulation that values everything that is already within it. It might also mean thinking education's outcomes away from previously established criteria and towards the ability to constantly affect and restructure its own field.

above copied from:http://www.kein.org/node/89

Monday, June 9, 2008

COPYRIGHT, COPYLEFT AND THE CREATIVE ANTI-COMMONS, Anna Nimus


> A Genealogy of Authors’ Property Rights

The author has not always existed. The image of the author as a wellspring of originality, a genius guided by some secret compulsion to create works of art out of a spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings, is an 18th century invention. This image continues to influence how people speak about the “great artists” of history, and it also trickles down to the more modest claims of the intellectual property regime that authors have original ideas that express their unique personality, and therefore have a natural right to own their works - or to sell their rights, if they should choose. Although these ideas appear self-evident today, they were an anomaly during their own time. The different pre-Enlightenment traditions did not consider ideas to be original inventions that could be owned because knowledge was held in common. Art and philosophy were products of the accumulated wisdom of the past. There were no authors - in the sense of original creators and final authorities - but only masters of various crafts (sculpture, painting, poetry, philosophy) whose task was to appropriate existing knowledge, re-organize it, make it specific to their age, and transmit it further. Artists and sages were messengers, and their ability to make knowledge manifest was considered a gift from the gods. Art was governed by a gift economy: aristocratic patronage was a gift in return for the symbolic gift of the work. Even the neoclassical worldview that immediately preceded Romanticism viewed art as imitation of nature and the artist as a craftsman who transmitted ideas that belonged to a common culture.

The Romantic revolution marked the birth of proprietary authorship. It abolished the belief that creations of the human intellect were gifts from the gods that could be policed by royal decrees. But while it liberated the productive capacity of individuals from supernatural causes and political control, it located this capacity in the sovereignty of the individual, ignoring the larger social context of production. And it chained the production of knowledge to the idea of private property that dominated philosophical and economic discourse since Locke. Romanticism’s re-definition of the artist as an original creator was an effect of a combination of political, economic and technological transformations. Industrial production during the 18th century led to increasing commodification. The enclosure of the commons forced many farmers who had lived off the land to become workers in industrial cities, and the dominance of market relations began to permeate all spheres of life. The sharp rise in literacy created a new middle-class public of consumers – a necessary precondition for commercializing culture. The capacity of the printing press to mass reproduce and distribute the written word destroyed established values, displacing art from the courts to coffee houses and salons. And as the feudal world of patronage withered away, along with the system of political sovereignty that had supported it, for the first time writers and artists tried to live from the profits earned from the sale of their works.

Romanticism was born as a contradictory response to these developments. It was an opposition to capitalism, but one expressed through the language of private property and the assumptions inherited from the philosophical discourse that legitimated capitalism’s mode of production. Romanticism denounced the alienation and loss of independence spawned by industrial production and market relations, and portrayed the artist in heroic opposition to the drive for profit. Adopting Rousseau’s metaphors of organic growth and Kant’s notion of genius as an innate force that created from within, Romantic authors celebrated the artist as a spontaneous, untamed being (like nature itself), guided by intuitive necessity and indifferent to social rules and conventions. By locating the work of art in a pre-social, natural self, its meaning was free from contamination with everyday life. Art was neither public, nor social, nor similar to the labour of workers who produced commodities. It was self-reflexive, offering a window to a transcendent subjectivity.

In the mid 1750s, Edward Young and Samuel Richardson were the first to argue that the work of an author, since it was a product of his unique personality, was more truly an author’s property than the material objects produced by a worker. This idea found its most enthusiastic supporters among German and English Romanticism, but also echoed in wider literary circles. In 1772 Lessing connected originality to rights over ideas and argued that authors were entitled to economic profits from their works. Realizing that the problem with defining ideas as property was that many people seemed to share the same ideas, in 1791 Fichte argued that for an idea to be regarded as property it had to have some distinguishing characteristic that allowed only a single individual to claim it. That quality lay not in the idea itself but in the unique form the author used to communicate it. Ideas that were common could become private property through the author’s original form of expression. It is this distinction between content (ideas) and form (the particular style and expression of those the ideas) that provided an initial foundation for intellectual property law. By the 1830s Wordsworth had effectively linked the notion of genius - defined as the introduction of a new element into the intellectual universe - to legal stakes in the copyright wars. Arguing that artistic genius was often not recognized by contemporaries but only after an author’s death, he became an active lobbyist for extending copyright to 60 years after an author’s death. Wordsworth’s duality in invoking the author as a solitary genius as well as an interested economic agent was symptomatic of the complicity between Romantic aesthetics and the logic of commodification. The Romantic worldview tried to elevate art to a pure space above commodity production, but its definition of the creative work as property reintegrated art into the very sphere it sought to negate.

The existence of “copy rights” predated 18th century notions of the author’s right to ownership. From the 16th to the 17th century royal licenses gave exclusive rights to certain publishers to copy (or print) particular texts. In 1557, England’s Queen Anne granted an exclusive printing monopoly to a London guild of printers, the Stationers Company, because it assured her control over which books were published or banned. The first copyrights were publishers’ rights to print copies, which emerged out of the ideological needs of absolutist monarchies to control knowledge and censor dissent. After the Licensing Act expired in 1694, the monopoly of the Stationers Company was threatened by provincial booksellers, the so-called “pirates” from Ireland and Scotland. The Stationers Company petitioned Parliament for a new bill to extend their copyright monopoly. But this was a different England from 1557: Parliament had executed King Charles I in 1649, abolished the monarchy and installed a republic under Cromwell, restored the monarchy with Charles II, overthrew James II in the Revolution of 1688, and, in 1689, it passed the first decree of modern constitutional sovereignty, the Bill of Rights. The Statute of Anne, passed in 1710 by Parliament, turned out to be a hard blow against the Stationers Company. The Statute declared authors (not publishers) to be owners of their works and limited the copyright term to 14 years for new books and 21 years for existing copyrights. The Statute, which was subtitled “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned,” tried to balance the philosophical ideas of the Enlightenment with the economic interests of a nascent capitalism by creating a marketplace of knowledge through competition.

The Statute’s aim was not to create an author’s copyright but to break the Stationers Company’s monopoly. Since this monopoly was too well established to be attacked superficially, reversing the ownership from publisher to author provided a solid basis. After the Statute of Anne was passed, the Stationers Company ignored its time limitations and a battle over literary property began in the law courts that lasted more than 50 years. In Millar vs. Taylor (1769), a London publisher belonging to the Stationers Company won a verdict supporting a common-law right of perpetual copyright despite the Statute of Anne. This decision was overturned in the landmark case of Donaldson vs. Becket (1774); the ruling in favor of the Scottish bookseller Donaldson rejected the argument for perpetual copyright and upheld the limits set out in the Statute of Anne. The principal players in what the press hailed as the great cause concerning literary property were not authors. Publishers sued each other in the courts, invoking the author’s rights as a pretext in their battle for economic power. The notion of the author as an originator with a natural right to own ideas may have been invented by artists and philosophers, but it was publishers who profited from it. Laws are not made by poets but by states, and states exist to enforce economic privilege, adopting whatever philosophical legitimation they find convenient at any given time. The Statute of Anne codified the capitalist form of the author-publisher relationship: copyright was attached to the author at birth but automatically assumed by publishers through the “neutral” mechanisms of the market. Authors had a right to own the products of their labour in theory, but since they created immaterial ideas and lacked the technological means to produce books, they had to sell their rights to another party with enough capital to exploit them. In essence, it was no different than having to sell their labour. The exploitation of the author was embedded in the intellectual property regime from its inception.

Intellectual property laws have shifted with the winds of history to justify specific interests. Countries that exported intellectual property favored the notion of authors’ natural rights, while developing nations, which were mainly importers, insisted on a more utilitarian interpretation that limited copyright by public interest. During the 19th century, American publishing companies justified their unauthorized publication of British writers on the utilitarian grounds that the public’s interest to have great works available for the cheapest possible price outweighed authors’ rights. By the beginning of the 20th century, as American authors became popular in Europe and American publishing companies became exporters of intellectual property, the law conveniently shifted, suddenly recognizing the natural rights of authors to own their ideas and forgetting previous theories of social utility. During the 20th century, intellectual property law has extended the rights of owners in several ways: by increasing the duration of copyright to lifetime plus 70 years, by standardizing international IP regimes to benefit corporations in economically dominant countries (achieved through shifting IP governance from the World Intellectual Property Organization to the World Trade Organization), and by redefining the means of protection and the types of intellectual property that could benefit from protection. Until the middle of the 19th century, copyright meant only protection against verbatim copying. Toward the end of the 19th century, this was redefined so that the property protected by copyright consisted (against Fichte’s definition) in the substance, and not in the form alone – which meant translations were also subject to copyright. Later this protection was extended to any close approximation of the original, like the plot of a novel or play or the use of the characters from a movie or book to create a sequel. The types of property protected by copyright have also expanded exponentially. In the beginning, copyright was a regulation of the reproduction of printed matter. But the legislation changed with each new technology of reproduction (words, sounds, photographs, moving images, digital information). At the beginning of the 20th century copyright was extended from covering texts to covering “works.” During a landmark court case in 1983 it was argued that computer software was also a “work” of original authorship analogous to poetry, music and painting in its ability to capture the author’s originality and creative imagination. This illustrates the wildly different contexts in which the myth of the creative genius has been invoked to legitimate economic interests. And in each of the landmark cases the focus has always shifted away from corporations (the real beneficiaries) to the sympathetic figure of the author, who people identify with and want to reward.

> Intellectual Property as Fraud

If property is theft, as Proudhon famously argued, then intellectual property is fraud. Property is theft because the owner of property has no legitimate claim to the product of labour. Except by denying workers access to the means of production, property owners could not extract any more than the reproduction costs of the instruments they contribute to the process. In the words of Benjamin Tucker, the lender of capital is entitled to its return intact, and nothing more. When the peasants of the pre-industrial age were denied access to common land by the new enclosures, it can be said that their land was stolen. But if physical property can be stolen, can intelligence or ideas be stolen? If your land is stolen, you cannot use it anymore, except on the conditions set by its new private “owner.” If ownership of an idea is analogous to the ownership of material property, it should be subject to the same conditions of economic exchange, forfeiture, and seizure - and if seized it would then cease to be the property of its owner. But if your idea is used by others, you have not lost your ability to use it – so what is really stolen? The traditional notion of property, as something that can be possessed to the exclusion of others, is irreconcilable with intangibles like ideas. Unlike a material object, which can exist in only one place at a given time, ideas are non-rivalrous and non-exclusive. A poem is no less an authors’ poem despite its existence in a thousand memories.

Intellectual property is a meaningless concept - ideas don’t behave like land and cannot be possessed or alienated. All the intellectual property debates fought in courthouses and among pamphleteers during the 18th century intuitively grasped this contradiction. What became obvious in these debates was that the rights to own ideas would have to be qualitatively different from the rights to own material property, and that the ease of reproducing ideas posed serious problems for enforcing such rights. In parallel to the philosophical debates about the nature of intellectual property, a monumental discourse criminalizing piracy and plagiarism began to emerge. The most famous rant against piracy was Samuel Richardson’s 1753 pamphlets denouncing unauthorized Irish reprints of his novel Sir Charles Grandison. Contrasting the enlightened English book industry with the savagery and wickedness of Irish piracy, Richardson criminalizes the reprints as theft. In actuality his claims had no legal basis since Ireland was not subject to England’s intellectual property regime. And what he denounced as piracy, Irish publishers saw as a just retaliation against the Stationers Company’s monopoly. A year before Richardson’s pamphlets, there were street riots in Dublin against British taxation policies, which were part of a larger political struggle of Irish independence from Britain. By arguing that this Cause is the Cause of Literature in general, Richardson framed the battle over literary property in purely aesthetic terms, isolating it from its political and economic context. But his use of the piracy metaphor recalled Britain’s colonial history and brutal repression of sea pirates. 18th century maritime piracy has itself been interpreted as a form of guerilla warfare against British imperialism, which also created alternative models of work, property and social relations based on a spirit of democracy, sharing, and mutual insurance.

Richardson’s account of originality and propriety excluded any notion of cultural appropriation and transmission. Never was work more the property of any man than this is his, he claims, portraying his novel as New in every sense of the word. His claim is especially ironic given his own appropriation, both in the novel and in the pamphlets, of stories of piracy and plagiarism from the popular literature of his time and from Heliodorus’ The Ethiopian, a 3rd century romance which was widely parodied throughout the 18th century. The idea of originality, and the possessive individualism it spawned, created a tidal wave of paranoia among the author “geniuses,” whose fear of being robbed seemed to mask a more basic fear that their claim to originality was nothing but a fiction.

Artistic creation is not born ex nihilo from the brains of individuals as a private language; it has always been a social practice. Ideas are not original, they are built upon layers of knowledge accumulated throughout history. Out of these common layers, artists create works that have their unmistakable specificities and innovations. All creative works reassemble ideas, words and images from history and their contemporary context. Before the 18th century, poets quoted their ancestors and sources of inspiration without formal acknowledgement, and playwrights freely borrowed plots and dialogue from previous sources without attribution. Homer based the Iliad and the Odyssey on oral traditions that dated back centuries. Virgil’s Aeneid is lifted heavily from Homer. Shakespeare borrowed many of his narrative plots and dialogue from Holinshed. This is not to say that the idea of plagiarism didn’t exist before the 18th century, but its definition shifted radically. The term plagiarist (literally, kidnapper) was first used by Martial in the 1st century to describe someone who kidnapped his poems by copying them whole and circulating them under the copier’s name. Plagiarism was a false assumption of someone else’s work. But the fact that a new work had similar passages or identical expressions to an earlier one was not considered plagiarism as long as the new work had its own aesthetic merits. After the invention of the creative genius, practices of collaboration, appropriation and transmission were actively forgotten. When Coleridge, Stendhall, Wilde and T.S. Eliot were accused of plagiarism for including expressions from their predecessors in their works, this reflected a redefinition of plagiarism in accordance with the modern sense of possessive authorship and exclusive property. Their so-called “theft” is precisely what all previous writers had regarded as natural.

Ideas are viral, they couple with other ideas, change shape, and migrate into unfamiliar territories. The intellectual property regime restricts the promiscuity of ideas and traps them in artificial enclosures, extracting exclusive benefits from their ownership and control. Intellectual property is fraud - a legal privilege to falsely represent oneself as the sole “owner” of an idea, expression or technique and to charge a tax to all who want to perceive, express or apply this “property” in their own production. It is not plagiarism that dispossesses an “owner” of the use of an idea; it is intellectual property, backed by the invasive violence of the state, that dispossesses everyone else from using their common culture. The basis for this dispossession is the legal fiction of the author as a sovereign individual who creates original works out of the wellspring of his imagination and thus has a natural and exclusive right to ownership. Foucault unmasked authorship as a functional principle that impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of knowledge. The author-function represents a form of despotism over the proliferation of ideas. The effects of this despotism, and of the system of intellectual property that it shelters and preserves, is that it robs us of our cultural memory, censors our words, and chains our imagination to the law.

And yet artists continue to be flattered by their association with this myth of the creative genius, turning a blind eye to how it is used to justify their exploitation and expand the privilege of the property owning elite. Copyright pits author against author in a war of competition for originality – its effects are not only economic, it also naturalizes a certain process of knowledge production, delegitimates the notion of a common culture, and cripples social relations. Artists are not encouraged to share their thoughts, expressions and works or to contribute to a common pool of creativity. Instead, they jealously guard their “property” from others, who they view as potential competitors, spies and thieves lying in wait to snatch and defile their original ideas. This is a vision of the art world created in capitalism’s own image, whose ultimate aim is to make it possible for corporations to appropriate the alienated products of its intellectual workers.

> The Revolt against Intellectual Property

The private ownership of ideas over the last two centuries hasn’t managed to completely eradicate the memory of a common culture or the recognition that knowledge flourishes when ideas, words, sounds and images are free for everyone to use. Ever since the birth of the proprietary author, different individuals and groups have challenged the intellectual property regime and the “right” it gave to some private individuals to “own” creative works while preventing others from using and re-interpreting them. In his 1870 Poesies, Lautreamont called for a return of impersonal poetry, a poetry written by all. He added, Plagiarism is necessary. Progress implies it. It closely grasps an author’s sentence, uses his expressions, deletes a false idea, replaces it with a right one. His definition subverted the myth of individual creativity, which was used to justify property relations in the name of progress when it actually impeded progress by privatizing culture. The natural response was to reappropriate culture as a sphere of collective production without acknowledging artificial enclosures of authorship. Lautremont’s phrase became a benchmark for the 20th century avant-gardes. Dada rejected originality and portrayed all artistic production as recycling and reassembling - from Duchamp’s ready-mades, to Tzara’s rule for making poems from cut-up newspapers, to the photomontages of Hoech, Hausmann and Heartfield. Dada also challenged the idea of the artist as solitary genius and of art as a separate sphere by working collectively to produce not only art objects and texts, but media hoaxes, interventions at political gatherings and demonstrations on the street. Its assault on artistic values was a revolt against the capitalist foundations that created them.

Dadaist ideas were systematically developed into a theory (if often suffering on the level of real practice) by the Situationists. The SI acknowledged that detournement - putting existing artworks, films, advertisements and comic strips through a detour, or recoding their dominant meanings - was indebted to Dadaist practices, but with a difference. They saw Dada as a negative critique of dominant images (one that depended on the easy recognition of the image being negated), and defined detournement as a positive reuse of existing fragments simply as elements in the production of a new work. Detournement was not primarily an antagonism to tradition; it emphasized the reinvention of a new world from the scraps of the old. And implicitly, revolution was not primarily an insurrection against the past, but learning to live in a different way by creating new practices and forms of behavior. These forms of behavior also included collective writings, which were often unsigned, and an explicit refusal of the copyright regime by attaching the labels “no copyright” or “anticopyright” to their works, along with the directions for use: any of the texts in this book may be freely reproduced, translated or adapted even without mentioning the source.

It is these twin practices of detournement (Lautremont’s necessary plagiarism) and anticopyright that inspired many artistic and subcultural practices from the 1970s to the 1990s. John Oswald started doing sound collages that remixed copyrighted works during the 1970s. In 1985 he coined the term plunderphonics for the practice of audio piracy as a compositional prerogative, which he and others had been practicing. Oswald’s motto was: if creativity is a field, copyright is the fence. His 1989 album Plunderphonics, which contained 25 tracks that remixed material from Beethoven to Michael Jackson, was threatened by legal action for copyright violation. Negativland has become the most infamous of the plunderphonic bands after their parody of U2’s song “I Still Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For” was sued by U2’s record label for violating both copyright and trademark law. Plundervisuals also has a long tradition. Found footage film goes back to Bruce Connor’s work in the 1950s, but became more prevalent after the 1970s with Chick Strand, Mathew Arnold, Craig Baldwin and Keith Sanborn. With the invention of the video recorder, the practice of scratch video, which detourned images recorded directly from television programs and ads, became very popular during the 1980s because of the relative ease of production compared to the found film’s splicing of celluloid. A form of more depolititicized, postmodern plagiarism has also achieved widespread reputation in literary and artistic circles during the 1990s with Kathy Acker’s novels - her Empire of the Senseless plagiarized a chapter of William Gibson’s Neuromancer with only minor rewriting - and with Sherrie Levine’s image appropriations of Walker Evans, Van Gogh and Duchamp.

Steward Home, a well-known proponent of plagiarism and organizer of several Festivals of Plagiarsm from 1988-1989, has also advocated the use of multiple names as a tactic for challenging the myth of the creative genius. The significant difference is that whereas plagiarism can be easily recuperated as an artform, with star plagiarists like Kathy Acker or Sherrie Levine, the use of multiple names requires a self-effacement that draws attention away from the name of the author. The use of multiple names goes back to Neoism, which encouraged artists to work together under the shared name of Monty Cantsin. After his break with Neoism, Home and others started using the name Karen Eliot. The practice also caught on in Italy, where the Luther Blissett name was used by hundreds of artists and activists between 1994 and 1999. Luther Blissett became a kind of Robin Hood of the information age, playing elaborate pranks on the culture industry, always acknowledging responsibility and explaining what cracks in the system were exploited to plant a fake story. After Luther Blissett’s symbolic suicide in 1999, five writers who were active in the movement invented the collective pseudonym Wu Ming, which means “no name” in Chinese. The collective, anonymous name is also a refusal of the machine that turns writers into celebrity names. By challenging the myth of the proprietary author, Wu Ming claims they’ve only made explicit what should already be obvious - there are no “geniuses,” thus there are no “lawful owners,” there is only exchange, re-use and improvement of ideas. Wu Ming adds that this notion, which once appeared natural but has been marginalized for the past two centuries, is now becoming dominant again because of the digital revolution and the success of free software and the General Public License.

Digitalization has proven to be much more of a threat to conventional notions of authorship and intellectual property than the plagiarism practiced by radical artists or critiques of the author by poststructuralist theorists. The computer is dissolving the boundaries essential to the modern fiction of the author as a solitary creator of unique, original works. Ownership presupposes a separation between texts and between author and reader. The artificiality of this separation is becoming more apparent. On mailinglists, newsgroups and open publishing sites, the transition from reader to writer is natural, and the difference between original texts vanishes as readers contribute commentary and incorporate fragments of the original in their response without the use of quotation. Copyrighting online writing seems increasingly absurd, because it is often collectively produced and immediately multiplied. As online information circulates without regard for the conventions of copyright, the concept of the proprietary author really seems to have become a ghost of the past. Perhaps the most important effect of digitalization is that it threatens the traditional benefactors of intellectual property since monopolistic control by book publishers, music labels and the film industry is no longer necessary as ordinary people are taking up the means of production and distribution for themselves.

Free software guru Richard Stallman claims that in the age of the digital copy the role of copyright has been completely reversed. While it began as a legal measure to allow authors to restrict publishers for the sake of the general public, copyright has become a publishers’ weapon to maintain their monopoly by imposing restrictions on a general public that now has the means to produce their own copies. The aim of copyleft more generally, and of specific licenses like the GPL, is to reverse this reversal. Copyleft uses copyright law, but flips it over to serve the opposite of its usual purpose. Instead of fostering privatization, it becomes a guarantee that everyone has the freedom to use, copy, distribute and modify software or any other work. Its only “restriction” is precisely the one that guarantees freedom – users are not permitted to restrict anyone else’s freedom since all copies and derivations must be redistributed under the same license. Copyleft claims ownership legally only to relinquish it practically by allowing everyone to use the work as they choose as long the copyleft is passed down. The merely formal claim of ownership means that no one else may put a copyright over a copylefted work and try to limit its use.

Seen in its historical context, copyleft lies somewhere between copyright and anticopyright. The gesture by writers of anticopyrighting their works was made in a spirit of generosity, affirming that knowledge can flourish only when it has no owners. As a declaration of “no rights reserved” anticopyright was a perfect slogan launched in an imperfect world. The assumption was that others would be using the information in the same spirit of generosity. But corporations learned to exploit the lack of copyright and redistribute works for a profit. Stallman came up with the idea of copyleft in 1984 after a company that made improvements to software he had placed in the public domain (the technical equivalent of anticopyright, but without the overt gesture of critique) privatized the source code and refused to share the new version. So in a sense, copyleft represents a coming of age, a painful lesson that relinquishing all rights can lead to abuse by profiteers. Copyleft attempts to create a commons based on reciprocal rights and responsibilities – those who want to share the common resources have certain ethical obligations to respect the rights of other users. Everyone can add to the commons, but no one may subtract from it.

But in another sense copyleft represents a step back from anticopyright and is plagued by a number of contradictions. Stallman’s position is in agreement with a widespread consensus that copyright has been perverted into a tool that benefits corporations rather than the authors for whom it was originally intended. But no such golden age of copyright exists. Copyright has always been a legal tool that coupled texts to the names of authors in order to transform ideas into commodities and turn a profit for the owners of capital. Stallman’s idealized view of the origins of copyright does not recognize the exploitation of authors by the early copyright system. This specific myopia about copyright is part of a more general non-engagement with economic questions. The “left” in copyleft resembles a vague sort of libertarianism whose main enemies are closed, nontransparent systems and totalitarian restrictions on access to information rather than economic privilege or the exploitation of labour. Copyleft emerged out of a hacker ethic that comes closest to the pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake. Its main objective is defending freedom of information against restrictions imposed by “the system,” which explains why there’s such a wide range of political opinions among hackers. It also explains why the commonality that links hackers together - the “left” in Stallman’s vision of copyleft - is not the left as it’s understood by most political activists.

The GPL and copyleft is frequently invoked as an example of the free software movement’s anticommercial bias. But there is no such bias. The four freedoms required by the GPL – the freedom to run, study, distribute and improve the source code so long as the same freedom is passed down – means that any additional restriction, like a non-commercial clause, would be non-free. Keeping software “free” does not prevent developers from selling copies they’ve modified with their own labour and it also does not prevent redistribution (without modification) for a fee by a commercial company, as long as the same license is passed down and the source code remains transparent. This version of freedom does not abolish exchange – as some free software enthusiasts have claimed – nor is it even incompatible with a capitalist economy based on the theft of surplus value. The contradiction inherent in this commons is partly due to the understanding of proprietary as synonymous with closed-sourced or nontransparent. Proprietary means having an owner who prohibits access to information, who keeps the source code secret; it does not necessarily mean having an owner who extracts a profit, although keeping the source code secret and extracting a profit often coincide in practice. As long as the four conditions are met, commercial redistribution of free software is nonproprietary. The problem is more obvious when translating this condition to content-based works, like poems, novels, films, or music. If someone releases a novel under a copyleft license, and Random House prints it and makes a profit off the author’s work, there’s nothing wrong with this as long as the copyleft is passed down. To be free means to be open to commercial appropriation, since freedom is defined as the nonrestrictive circulation of information rather than as freedom from exploitation.

It comes as no surprise that the major revision in applying copyleft to the production of artworks, music and texts has been to permit copying, modifying and redistributing as long as it’s non-commercial. Wu Ming claim it is necessary to place a restriction on commercial use or use for profit in order to prohibit the parasitic exploitation of cultural workers. They justify this restriction, and its divergence from the GPL and GFDL versions of copyleft, on the grounds that the struggle against exploitation and the fight for a fair remuneration of labour is the cornerstone of the history of the left. Other content providers and book publishers (Verso, for example) have expanded this restriction by claiming that copying, modifying and redistributing should not only be non-profit but also in the spirit of the original - without explaining what this “spirit” means. Indymedia Romania revised its copyleft definition to make the meaning of “in the spirit of the original” clearer after repeated problems with the neofascist site Altermedia Romania, whose “pranks” ranged from hijacking the indymedia.ro domain to copying texts from Indymedia and lying about names and sources. Indymedia Romania’s restrictions include: not modifying the original name or source since it goes against the desire for transparency, not reproducing the material for profit since it abuses the spirit of generosity, and not reproducing the material in a context that violates the rights of individuals or groups by discriminating against them on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, gender or sexuality since it contradicts its commitment to equality.

While some have multiplied restrictions, others have rejected any restriction at all, including the single restriction imposed by the initial copyleft. It is the movement around peer-to-peer filesharing that comes closest to the gesture of anticopyright. The best example is the Copyriot blog by Rasmus Fleischer of Pyratbiran (Bureau of Piracy), an anti-IP think tank and the one-time founders of Pirate Bay, the most used Bittorent tracker in the P2P community. The motto of copyriot is no copyright, no license. But there is a difference from the older anticopyright tradition. Fleischer claims that copyright has become absurd in the age of digital technology because it has to resort to all sorts of fictions, like distinctions between uploading and downloading or between producer and consumer, which don’t actually exist in horizontal P2P communication. Pyratbiran rejects copyright in its entirety – not because it was flawed in its inception, but because it was invented to regulate an expensive, one-way machine like the printing press, and it no longer corresponds to the practices that have been made possible by current technologies of reproduction.

Stallman’s original definition of copyleft attempts to found an information commons solely around the principle of information freedom – in this sense it is purely formal, like a categorical imperative that demands freedom of information to be universalizable. The only limit to belonging to this community is those who do not share the desire for free information – they are not excluded, they refuse to participate because they refuse to make information free. Other versions of copyleft have tried to add further restrictions based on a stronger interpretation of the “left” in copyleft as needing to be based not on a negative freedom from restrictions but on positive principles like valuing social cooperation above profit, nonhierarchical participation and nondiscrimination. The more restrictive definitions of copyleft attempt to found an information commons that is not just about the free flow of information but sees itself as part of a larger social movement that bases its commonality on shared leftist principles. In its various mutations, copyleft represents a pragmatic, rational approach that recognizes the limits of freedom as implying reciprocal rights and responsibilities – the different restrictions represent divergent interpretations about what these rights and responsibilities should be. By contrast, anticopyright is a gesture of radicality that refuses pragmatic compromises and seeks to abolish intellectual property in its entirety. Anticopyright affirms a freedom that is absolute and recognizes no limits to its desire. The incompatibility between these positions poses a dilemma: do you affirm absolute freedom, knowing it could be used against you, or moderate freedom by restricting the information commons to communities who won’t abuse it because they share the same “spirit”?

> The Creative Anti-Commons Compromise

The dissidents of intellectual property have had a rich history among avant-garde artists, zine producers, radical musicians, and the subcultural fringe. Today the fight against intellectual property is being led by lawyers, professors and members of government. Not only is the social strata of the leading players very different, which in itself might not be such an important detail, but the framework of the struggle against intellectual property has completely changed. Before law professors like Lawrence Lessig became interested in IP, the discourse among dissidents was against any ownership of the commons, intellectual or physical. Now center stage is occupied by supporters of property and economic privilege. The argument is no longer that the author is a fiction and that property is theft, but that intellectual property law needs to be restrained and reformed because it now infringes upon the rights of creators. Lessig criticizes the recent changes in copyright legislation imposed by global media corporations and their powerful lobbies, the absurd lengths to which copyright has been extended, and other perversions that restrict the creativity of artists. But he does not question copyright as such, since he views it as the most important incentive for artists to create. The objective is to defend against IP extremism and absolutism, while preserving IP’s beneficial effects.

In his keynote at Wizards of OS4 in Berlin, Lessig celebrated the Read-Write culture of free sharing and collaborative authorship that has been the norm for most of history. During the last century this Read-Write culture has been thwarted by IP legislation and converted to a Read-Only culture dominated by a regime of producer-control. Lessig bemoans the recent travesties of copyright law that have censured the work of remix artists like DJ Dangermouse (The Grey Album) and Javier Prato (Jesus Christ: The Musical). Both were torpedoed by the legal owners of the music used in the production of their works, as were John Oswald and Negativland before them. In these cases the wishes of the artists, who were regarded as mere consumers in the eyes of the law, were subordinated to control by the producers - the Beatles and Gloria Gaynor, respectively - and their legal representatives. The problem is that producer-control is creating a Read-Only culture and destroying the vibrancy and diversity of creative production. It is promoting the narrow interests of a few privileged “producers” at the expense of everybody else. Lessig contrasts producer-control to the cultural commons - a common stock of value that all can use and contribute to. The commons denies producer-control and insists on the freedom of consumers. The “free” in free culture refers to the natural freedom of consumers to use the common cultural stock and not the state-enforced freedom of producers to control the use of “their” work. In principle, the notion of a cultural commons abolishes the distinction between producers and consumers, viewing them as equal actors in an ongoing process.

Lessig claims that today, as a result of commons-based peer-production and the Creative Commons project more specifically, the possibility of a Read-Write culture is reborn. But is the Creative Commons really a commons? According to its website, Creative Commons defines the spectrum of possibilities between full copyright - all rights reserved - and the public domain - no rights reserved. Our licenses help you keep your copyright while inviting certain uses of your work - a “some rights reserved” copyright. The point is clear: Creative Commons exists to help “you,” the producer, keep control of “your” work. You are invited to choose among a range of restrictions you wish to apply to “your” work, such as forbidding duplication, forbidding derivative works, or forbidding commercial use. It is assumed that as an author-producer everything you make and everything you say is your property. The right of the consumer is not mentioned, nor is the distinction between producers and consumers of culture disputed. Creative Commons legitimates, rather than denies, producer-control and enforces, rather than abolishes, the distinction between producer and consumer. It expands the legal framework for producers to deny consumers the possibility to create use-value or exchange-value out of the common stock.

Had the Beatles and Gloria Gaynor published their work within the framework of Creative Commons, it would still be their choice and not the choice of DJ Dangermouse or Javier Patro whether The Grey Album or Jesus Christ: The Musical should be allowed to exist. The legal representatives of the Beatles and Gloria Gaynor could just as easily have used CC licenses to enforce their control over the use of their work. The very problem of producer-control presented by Lessig is not solved by the Creative Commons “solution” as long as the producer has an exclusive right to choose the level of freedom to grant the consumer, a right that Lessig has never questioned. The Creative Commons mission of allowing producers the “freedom” to choose the level of restrictions for publishing their work contradicts the real conditions of commons-based production. Lessig’s use of DJ Dangermouse and Javier Patro as examples to promote the cause of Creative Commons is an extravagant dishonesty.

A similar dishonesty is present in Lessig’s praise of the Free Software movement because its architecture assures everyone (technologically as well as legally, in the form of its licenses) the possibility to use the common resource of the source code. Despite its claim to be extending the principles of the free software movement, the freedom Creative Commons gives to creators to choose how their works are used is very different from the freedom the GPL gives to users to copy, modify and distribute the software as long as the same freedom is passed down. Stallman recently made a statement rejecting Creative Commons in its entirety because some of its licenses are free while others are non-free, which confuses people into mistaking the common label for something substantial when in fact there’s no common standard and no ethical position behind the label. Whereas copyleft claims ownership legally only to relinquish it practically, the references to ownership by Creative Commons is no longer an ironic reversal but real. The pick and choose CC licenses allow arbitrary restrictions on the freedom of users based on an authors’ particular preferences and tastes. In this sense, Creative Commons is a more elaborate version of copyright. It doesn’t challenge the copyright regime as a whole, nor does it preserve its legal shell in order to turn the practice of copyright on its head, like copyleft does.

The public domain, anticopyright and copyleft are all attempts to create a commons, a shared space of non-ownership that is free for everyone to use. The conditions of use may differ, according to various interpretations of rights and responsibilities, but these rights are common rights and the resources are shared alike by the whole community – their use is not decided arbitrarily, on a case by case basis, according to the whims of individual members. By contrast, Creative Commons is an attempt to use a regime of property ownership (copyright law) to create a non-owned, culturally shared resource. Its mixed bag of cultural goods are not held in common since it is the choice of individual authors to permit their use or to deny it. Creative Commons is really an anti-commons that peddles a capitalist logic of privatization under a deliberately misleading name. Its purpose is to help the owners of intellectual property catch up with the fast pace of information exchange, not by freeing information, but by providing more sophisticated definitions for various shades of ownership and producer-control.

What began as a movement for the abolition of intellectual property has become a movement of customizing owners’ licenses. Almost without notice, what was once a very threatening movement of radicals, hackers and pirates is now the domain of reformists, revisionists, and apologists for capitalism. When capital is threatened, it co-opts its opposition. We have seen this scenario many times throughout history – its most spectacular example is the transformation of self-organized workers’ councils into a trade union movement that negotiates legal contracts with the owners of corporations. The Creative Commons is a similar subversion that does not question the “right” to private property but tries to get small concessions in a playing field where the game and its rules are determined in advance. The real effect of Creative Commons is to narrow political contestation within the sphere of the already permissible.

While narrowing this field of contestation, Creative Commons simultaneously portrays itself as radical, as the avant-garde of the battle against intellectual property. Creative Commons has become a kind of default orthodoxy in non-commercial licensing, and a popular cause among artists and intellectuals who consider themselves generally on the left and against the IP regime in particular. The Creative Commons label is moralistically invoked on countless sites, blogs, speeches, essays, artworks and pieces of music as if it constituted the necessary and sufficient condition for the coming revolution of a truly “free culture.” Creative Commons is part of a larger copyfight movement, which is defined as a fight to keep intellectual property tethered to its original purpose and to prevent it from going too far. The individuals and groups associated with this movement (John Perry Barlow, David Bollier, James Boyle, Creative Commons, EFF, freeculture.org, Larry Lessig, Jessica Litman, Eric Raymond, Slashdot.org) advocate what Boyle has called a smarter IP, or a reform of intellectual property that doesn’t threaten free speech, democracy, competition, innovation, education, the progress of science, and other things that are critically important to our (?) social, cultural, and economic well-being.

In an uncanny repetition of the copyright struggles that first emerged during the period of Romanticism, the excesses of the capitalist form of intellectual property are opposed, but using its own language and presuppositions. Creative Commons preserves Romanticism’s ideas of originality, creativity and property rights, and similarly considers “free culture” to be a separate sphere existing in splendid isolation from the world of material production. Ever since the 18th century, the ideas of “creativity” and “originality” have been inextricably linked to an anti-commons of knowledge. Creative Commons is no exception. There’s no doubt that Creative Commons can shed light on some of the issues in the continuing struggle against intellectual property. But it is insufficient at best, and, at its worst, it’s just another attempt by the apologists of property to confuse the discourse, poison the well, and crowd out any revolutionary analysis.

This text developed out of a series of conversations and correspondences between Joanne Richardson and Dmytri Kleiner. Many thanks to all who contributed to its production: Saul Albert, Mikhail Bakunin, David Berry, Critical Art Ensemble, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Michel Foucault, Martin Fredriksson, Marci Hamilton, Carla Hesse, Benjamin Mako Hill, Stewart Home, Dan Hunter, Mark Lemley, Lawrence Lessig, Karl Marx, Giles Moss, Milton Mueller, Piratbyran, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Toni Prug, Samuel Richardson, Patrice Riemens, Mark Rose, Pamela Samuelson, the Situationist International, Johan Soderberg, Richard Stallman, Kathryn Temple, Benjamin Tucker, Jason Toynbee, Tristan Tzara, Wikipedia, Martha Woodmansee, Wu Ming.

Berlin, 2006. Anticopyright. All rights dispersed.

(Portugese translation at http://remixtures.com/2007/01/copyright-copyleft-e-as-creative-anti-commons-parte-i/ - in 4 parts with commentary - and compiled at http://www.openelibrary.info/autorsview.php?id_autore=745)

Above copied from: http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors0/nimustext.html

Saturday, March 1, 2008

Proposals for Creative Research: Introduction to the MyCreativity Reader, Geert Lovink and Ned Rossiter


We are pleased to present the MyCreativity Reader on international creative industries research. Our interest in MyCreativity has been to assemble a range of expertise and experiences that signal the diversity of creative industries. It’s been clear to us that – within policy and academic circles at least – creative industries operate as a meme that mobilises expectations. The term provokes an interesting range of human responses, from curiosity to outrage and disgust. Creative industries are not simply an empty signifier that grafts on to anything you please. There are contours and forces that guide the creative industries meme in some directions, and not others. We cannot take for granted what ‘creative industries’ means and consists of.

Creative industries are a contested zone in the making. While policy draws on a set of presuppositions around the borderless nature of cultural and economic flows, situated creativity is anything but global. Concepts are always contextual. The MyCreativity project intends to play an active part in shaping critical trajectories in the field by introducing overlooked aspects to creative practice and research. MyCreativity seeks to articulate creative industries as ‘concrete research’ (Tronti). This requires active invention but we also need to reply to the invitation. Pressing delete does nothing to rebuild and transform prevailing agendas. In this case the decision to ignore can lead to ignorance.

Creative industries has an ambition to hardwire its concepts into infrastructure. Policy leads to urban development, employment conditions, flows of economic investment, border movements, and so on. The macro dimension operating here is simply too big to set aside. You will be affected whether you like to not. So press that delete button, but do so at your own peril. Policy as a genre isn’t exactly bedtime reading. It’s all too easy to ignore for that reason. But like any game, rules can always be broken. Where is the cheat-sheet for creative industries policy?

Governments are slowly acknowledging the human dimension to climatic change, but there is still a remarkable indifference by creative workers to connect their own conditions to the shaping effects of ministerial directives. It seems totally bizarre that many seem to have a non-secular version of working life. No matter how alien it appears, policy does not drift down from the heavens.

Yet so often policy seems to have forgotten its own material constitution and reason of existence. Why, for instance, have the experiences and conditions of creative workers been ignored in the policy realm for so long? This is no accident. Policy formation has been notable for its monopoly of expectations. But it’s the view of MyCreativity that a threefold shift is happening within the creative industries:

1) a policy environment is slowly being forced to address the non-deliverables of incubator investment and corporate welfarism;

2) variable, not homologous, conditions of creative work exist within specific locations, values and geopolitical forces;

3) methodologies arise out of a will to collaborate, despite the many cultural, economic, geographic and in some cases technological obstacles.

In our view, such developments should be supported and further accelerated through policy measures, which for too long now have resulted in research that holds little correlation to the actually existing changes going on in the creative industries. The question is how to intervene in a policy debate? This is the predicament of militant research. Who is listening beyond the ghetto? Activist research requires its own 2.0 model of concept distribution. This is how the space of policy can be penetrated from the margins. (And, it must be said, this is also how the unpaid masses might do the work of policy formation – in the same way that gamer-geeks voluntarily engage the pleasure of game modification for industrial beneficiaries. ) The trick, however, is to speed up the percolation of ideas, issues and politics that inform the practice of not just creative producers but also potential funders, clients, government policy-makers and citizen- consumers. We are not talking about the harmonization of interests among ‘stakeholders’. It is a mistake to not recognize conflictual collaboration as the primary means through which ideas and innovation are generated. The challenge is to build relations and points of connection that enable a plurality of research platforms and small business initiatives that can survive beyond the initial consensus model of three month incubators.

Zero Standards and the Policy Parade
The greatest struggle of policy-making within the creative industries has been to address the crisis of old structures associated with the industrial age. While Marx’s poetic maxim ‘all that is solid melts into air’ described a certain power of Modernity, it is not the case that modern institutions and industries rise phoenix like from the ashes of industrial collapse brought about by just-in-time production associated with the global division of labour and the informatisation of social relations. Who, we might ask, are the stakeholders of creative industries? In the Richard Florida approach it all becomes a question of engineering the right bottom-up climate, infrastructure or conditions for revitalising collapsed cities and regions. In this paradigm, creative industries policy is about creating circumstances conducive to the sign of the knowledge or information economy. In the end, the creative industries formula serves to maintain an artificial stability around a workable definition. In this monopoly of the sign we find a great disjuncture with the actual conditions and needs of the real existing creativity.

What if you do not fit into the statistical regime of governance that determines productivity and conformity to policy within the creative industries? Even if you do fit in, are you aware of this? Do hairdressers in Rotterdam know they are included as a creative sector, but if they are in The Hague they are not? This not only brings any sense of a national creative industries policy into disarray, but it also undermines any coherence of the index-mania across the cool creative cities of the world. Standards simply do not exist. These indices are an attempt to account for local vitality in an age of massive contingency. By making visible the industrial sectors of creativity and their contribution to GDP, policy aims to bootstrap creativity as an economic force in its own right. Creative industries do not follow the multi-national corporate model of locating in places of the cheapest labour. The surplus value of creativity cannot be so easily calculated. Why does Nokia research leave creative Los Angeles for the even more expensive city of London? This is hardly an economic decision. Both are global cities according to Saskia Sassen’s definition. But California has suffered from the restrictions on creative imagination as a result of the post-911 fallout and the trickle down effect of the Bush regime. This should be a clear reminder that we do not yet inhabit a post-national world.

The other key factor at work has to do with the proximity of innovation in California to the materiality of failed business models left over from the dotcom era. The quest for a killer-app business model is simply not there. The peer-to-peer formats of production are fantastic, for sure. But there is no redistribution of absent revenues to creative producers. This contradiction inside digital capitalism is only further accelerating and takes us in to unknown territories. There will be no Hegelian synthesis in which the aspiring billions make money through ‘friends’. The creative industries policy appeals to the rationality of intellectual property regimes as the primary means of profit generation. But again, this does nothing as far as economic benefits for creative producers. There is an economic model for creative workers but it no longer figures around the exchange value of the commodity object. Instead, it is based on creativity as a service model. You go and perform your concerts, you install a company’s IT requirements, you design viral memes, you wait on a restaurant table. There is a logic of equivalence at work here, but it’s not going to make you rich fast. If anything, it’s going to rapidly sap any creative juices out of you.

Who is the Creative Subject?
How to make visible and furnish discursive legitimacy for subjects hitherto not addressed within the majoritarian language of creative industries policy? This is both an economic and a social-political problem. Much like any power game, creative industries discourse is about who is in and who is out. That much is obvious. What is at stake is whether or not creative industries discourse is able to escape the hype reminiscent of the dotcom era and massively redistribute government support to those undertaking real invention and experimentation. No more handouts for Big Media and mediocre consultants.

Corporations and mainstream media are hardly innovators of creativity, yet they remain the primary recipients of government welfare. Despite the ‘victory’ of the incubator model, it is not as though there is a shortage of ‘best practices’ out there. Where is the venture capital for fashion designers? Certainly, biotech holds its attractions on the share-market, but what of the ‘long tail’ of design economies? In other words, what is required are distributive and flexible systems of funding for creative practitioners. In this way, we would begin to see a synergy between the digital technologies of communication and the technics of cultural production. It is clear to us that there is little chance of sustainability in the current system that continues to think that creative economies can be grafted onto modern systems and institutions of governance.

The current institutional arrangements continue to think the docile dog can learn a new trick. Yes, ‘We need to be more creative’. But this agenda is way too convenient. It takes comfort precisely in its refusal to admit disruptive agencies that intervene or straight out ignore bureaucratic directives. This is why creativity cannot be ordered and very often it cannot be incorporated. Deviation has always been a problem of governance. We need a creative subject who is neither a citizen nor a consumer. Web 2.0 makes loud noises about the false synthesis of the so-called ‘prosumer’, but this does not get us very far other than reiterating the logic of individualisation.
There is no subject per se of creative industries. Rather, there is a diverse and continuously modulating culture of self-valorisation and perhaps auto-denigration. There is a celebration of the multiple identity – you are many, and will never have the security of being one. And this often means you are nobody. We wish to retrieve self-valorisation as a productive concept that grants legitimacy and possible stability to collaborative practice. Such a move is necessary, particularly in an institutional environment that shows few signs of departing from the script of modern governance struggling to engage the complexities of knowledge and information economies. This leads to the difficult question of alternative business models outside of government funding.

Free Culture Costs Money
There is no universal recommendation or model for practitioners in the creative industries. Creative practice consists of what Spivak terms ‘irreducible idiomatics’ of expression. One size does not fit all, in other words. You wouldn’t spot this if you limited your reading list to government policy, however. A universal definition does exist within this realm: creative industries consists of ‘the generation and exploitation of intellectual property’. In all seriousness, how many creative practitioners would call themselves producers, let alone financial beneficiaries, of intellectual property? Most probably don’t even know what IP means. We must redefine creative industries outside of IP generation. This is the dead-end of policy. When understood as ‘the generation and exploitation of intellectual property’, creative industries registers the ‘banal evil’ of policy mentalities, and assumes people only create to produce economic value. There needs to be a balance between alternative business models and the freedom to commit senseless acts of creativity. The tension between these two constituent realities is what needs to be investigated.

There are also severe limits to the ‘open cultures’ model that stems from libertarian and open sources cults. The free culture model is essentially a North American libertarian view of the world in its own image. European activists are quick to reproduce this and, in avoiding the question of money trails and connections, also avoid engaging key actors and issues that comprise ‘the political’ of information society and knowledge economies. Taken as a Will to Conformity, free culture serves as a political retreat that parades as radical self-affirmation.
Touching the auto-erotic drive to create without purpose, collaboration and the anarchistic rubric of mutual aid escapes these endless chains of re-appropriation. But they lack suspicion of instrumental intentionalism. These issues were the topic of a recent thread on the MyCreativity mailing list following a posting of a report in Spiegel magazine ranking Berlin as the number one ‘creative class’ city based on classic Floridarian indicators: in this case, what has been termed the ‘3T’s’ – Talent, Technology and Tolerance. The seductive power of such indicators inspires the proliferation of hype-economics, transporting Berlin from a ‘poor but sexy’ city to an economic nirvana populated by cool creative types. But the problem with such index obsession is that it functions through circumscription and the exclusion of a broader range of economic indicators that contradict such scenarios. In its 2007 city-ranking review, WirtschaftsWoche (Economic Weekly) undertook a comparison of 50 German cities according to employment, income, productivity and debt. Berlin came in at number 48. What does this say about Berlin’s 3T’s of creative economy? You can only conclude that the correspondence between indices and material realities are best left for policy fictions – despite all the groovy building sites along the Spree river.

Indicators never end. Any number of permutations is possible. But government policy-makers and corporate beneficiaries are rarely keen to promote a negative future-present. It is precisely these sorts of reasons that necessitate the counter-research advocated by MyCreativity. Media theorist and activist Matteo Pasquinelli proposes an analysis based on a Negative Index:

“Actually what I see is the risk of a ‘Barcelonisation’ of Berlin, named after the touristic turn of Barcelona that transformed its cultural and political heritage into a theme-park for a young rich global class. The legendary Berlin underground is under the process of a slow gentrification (you can gentrify even ‘intangible assets’). ‘Barcelonisation’ means a parasitic economy and not a productive one, an economy based on real-estate speculation and passive exploitation of natural resources (sun and good food for example): is such an economy ‘creative’, productive? Is that a model we can apply to Berlin? Still the most affordable capital of Europe (especially East Berlin), some think that the speculative mentality will never conquer Berliners as they are used to [cheap] rent and live on social housing. Will Berlin’s cultural industries develop a ‘parasitic’ economy based on speculation, local consumption and imported capitals or a productive economy based on production of knowledge/cultural and exportation of immaterial products? And what will be the impact of the Media Spree speculation (www.mediaspree.de) on the East Berlin cultural ecosystem?”

An army of sociologists and cultural researchers is slowly assembling around questions such as these. The creative industries meme dominates research funding calls in the humanities, after all. But don’t expect to read the results too easily – they come at a cost as well, with the vast majority of academics happily transferring their results of state-funded research into commercial publishing houses that charge crazy fees for access to their journals. Organization and management researcher Steffen Böhm responded in reflexive style to Pasquinelli: ‘I think it would be good to understand the process of how activists (like people on this list) and the communicational economy that this list is part of is the very vehicle that helps to create a speculative bubble around certain issues/places/things/symbols. In other words, how is it that critics of the system become the “driver” of the restructuring and transformation of that very system, enabling it to capture new forms of re-production?’.

Böhm attributes an influential power to critics and their capacity to shape the creative economies that is debatable. It is less the case of critics becoming drivers of bubble economies as it is the rise of cheap airlines determining markets for easy consumption. But he is correct to observe that critics and activists are agents within what he elegantly terms the ‘communicational economy’ of creative industries. How, though, to maximise this critical potential in ways that do have concrete impacts on the development of creative industries research and policy formation? As we noted earlier, can there be a 2.0 model for concept generation that goes beyond the easyJet mobility of the commuting class, boozing masses and conference circuits?

MyCreativity is first of all a call for the exchange of ideas, methodologies and collaborative constitution. Efforts at transdisciplinary research are really important here. The collective input of artists, designers, academics, policy-makers and activists is crucial. General concept development and detailed case studies are not a contradiction. Empirics interpenetrates concepts, and vice-versa. Of course we can’t take such research collaboration for granted. Not only are there considerable disciplinary and paradigmatic differences to negotiate, but there are also the banal practicalities of assembling people in a particular place in order to meet. Not everything can happen online. Beyond mailing lists and collaborative blogs, perhaps networked academies and distributed think-tanks are models for accommodating future critical research on creative industries. This reader could become one of many iterations of critical anthologies, just as the MyCreativity event in Amsterdam, November 2006, might register as a node among many similar events.

References

‘Berlin Tops Germany for “Creative Class”’, Spiegel, 10 October, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,510609,00.html.

‘Die erfolgreichsten Städte Deutschlands’, WirtschaftsWoche, 2007, http://onwirtschaft.t-online.de/c/83/96/99/8396998,pt=self,si=1.html.

Böhm, Steffen. ‘Re: [My-ci] Correction – Berlin Tops Germany for “Creative Class”’, posting to mycreativity mailing list, 18 October, 2007, http://idash.org/mailman/listinfo/my-ci.

Kücklich, Julian. ‘Precarious Playbour: Modders and the Digital Games Industry’, Fibreculture Journal 5 (2005), http://journal.fibreculture.org/issue5/kucklich.html.

Pasquinelli, Matteo. ‘Re: [My-ci] Berlin Tops Germany for “Creative Class”’, posting to mycreativity mailing list, 15 October, 2007, http://idash.org/mailman/listinfo/my-ci.



for the full My Creativity Reader see: http://www.networkcultures.org/_uploads/32.pdf

The above copied from: http://www.networkcultures.org/geert/proposals-for-creative-research-introduction-to-the-mycreativity-reade/